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 This dissertation explores the entanglements of racialized histories and 
experiences in America with conceptions of animals and animality and examines how 
African American and Native American writers render these intersections in early-
twentieth-century American literature. While animals, with their physical and behavioral 
features and subordinate status within Western cultural frameworks, were fundamental 
figures in the US racial imaginary, which relied on dehumanization as a weapon of 
control, animals (and conceptions about them) also curiously offered a way around and 
outside of the categorically demeaning declarations of “the human.” Through literary 
explorations of the nonhuman, the writers in this project reveal forms of interspecies 
affinity and understanding that affirm biotic connection and also make fantastically 
strange creatures with whom humans share domestic and proximal space. The figure of 
“the human” as separate, above, and radically distinct from other life becomes not only 
strange as well through these readings, but becomes visible as a prominent obstacle to 
social egalitarian and ecologically cooperative ways of living. I build on research in 
animal studies and critical race studies approaches to posthumanism to observe how race 
inflects literary animal representations while also tracking how animality interacts with 
various notions of personhood. While animalization often coincides with racialized and 
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dehumanized personhood status, writers like Anita Scott Coleman and Zitkala-Ša rupture 
those associations and engage the animal (comparisons to it and becomings with it) as a 
fundamentally humanizing figure. On the flip side, Zora Neale Hurston’s Their Eyes 
Were Watching God demonstrates how a racialized animalization trope operates in the 
novel to defend the killing of a black man. These writers all collapse the binary between 
human and animal while demonstrating how that binary operates in concert with racial 
binaries in an American context that extols the human. Reading animals through a lens 
that acknowledges how race and animality intersect ultimately opens routes for 
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The oft invoked “animal question” that circulates in scholarly critical 
examinations of human-animal relationships is—like the very subject it addresses—
multiple. In mainstream discourse and practice, it may seem as though the question 
remains unresolved from that first posed by René Descartes: Can animals think? 
Unresolved, since animals in the twenty-first century on the whole experience 
exploitation and mechanization on an incredibly vast scale through factory farming, 
laboratory use, industrial fishing, habitat transformation, and state-organized animal 
control, culling, or hunting. Such practices imply the disposability of beings who must be 
unthinking if such treatment is to be justifiable. But even as such practices persist, “the 
animal question” continues to evolve. Its precursors in Western thought—Jeremy 
Bentham asking whether animals can suffer; Jacob von Uexküll conjecturing about 
animal perceptive worlds (their Umwelts); Jacques Derrida initiating more recent 
inquiries into animal being through the deconstruction of language—all proposed ways of 
approaching nonhuman being as valuable and important. Questions today (which often 
occupy monograph subheads) are no less fundamental, and in fact may be even more 
fundamental in that they not only speculate about animal experience, but interrogate the 
foundations of Western rationalist thought that historically relegated animals to a 
subordinate and inferior status in the first place.  
In recent years, “the animal question” has become in some ways a flexible set of 
signs that can be filled in with different questions as they arise. Contemporary questions 
ask such things as: Why have animal studies in the humanities boomed in recent years? 
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What exactly is “the animal” (if it can be termed so simply and categorically)? How does 
human language manufacture a lack of animal agency? By what means does capitalism 
propel animal commodification as necessary and innocuous? How do social identities 
like race, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, and class influence how animals are depicted, 
regarded, and ultimately treated? And should animals occupy a space of concern when 
human injustice continues to go on across the world? This project engages with some of 
these questions which, though they are multiple, are also inseparable. These questions 
also get at a root problem that stems from a common source: the hierarchical devaluation 
of Others as a matter of course that serves as a structuring element in Western social 
organization.  
Most prominently, this dissertation asks how race and the animal intersect 
historically and culturally, and how this intersection becomes perceptible in early-
twentieth-century American literature. African American beastialization in the nineteenth 
and early-twentieth centuries, Enlightenment-era Great Chain of Being hierarchies that 
position black people nearer to apes than to whites, and scientific racism at the turn of the 
century are histories that precede and inform the construction of blackness in the US, and 
which use animality as a tool of inferiorization (Kim 36-41).1 These European and 
Euroamerican-authored histories invoke the animal to draw boundaries around the white 
human, and thus invent a human/animal binary that cooperates with and fuels logics of 
racialization. Dehumanization thus becomes a concept and practice that many African 
American writers in the early twentieth century devote enormous attention to refuting, 
with either direct confrontations to animalizing rhetorics or with the rhetorical adoption 
                                                 
1 In 1900, Charles Carroll’s The Negro a Beast was a particularly disturbing contribution to the 
beastialization of black people that distinctly rejected both Darwinism and Enlightenment Christianity to 
invoke Creationism in its claim that Man and the Negro were created separately (Kim 41). 
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of W.E.B. Du Bois’s ideology of racial uplift. At the same cultural moment, interesting 
things happen with conceptualizations of animals seemingly outside of racial terms. 
Following broader cultural acceptance of Charles Darwin’s theories of evolution that 
recognize humans as animal beings with primate progenitors, writers begin exploring not 
only “the animal within,” but the very nature of the medium commonly thought to 
separate human and animal: language. Assumptions about the superiority of human 
consciousness are also challenged and speculations about animal consciousness are 
investigated through modernist forms that move radically away from realist narratives 
and instead toward avant-garde experiments with textual expression and 
meaninglessness. At this juncture, the figurative animal materializes with distinct force in 
African American writing, where it is sometimes relegated to the background and other 
times brought forward in accompaniment with the racialized histories that entangle it. 
The African American writers that this dissertation engages—Zora Neale Hurston and 
Anita Scott Coleman—illustrate how the American legal system, for instance, is a salient 
setting for invoking narratives about animals because within it black personhood must 
still be distinguished and asserted. These intersections require more attention in 
articulating the full extent to which the American political and cultural imaginary relies 
on animality as a figurative eraser of personhood. 
Much work waits to be done in thinking through race and animal representation in 
early-twentieth-century literature, and in addressing the urgent project of untangling 
rhetorics of subjugation around race and animals. This issue remains pressing because as 
animals continue to be exploited and subordinated, attempts to bring violent practices to 
an end through animal rights literature and activism still tend to rely on abolitionist and 
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civil rights discourses in framing how oppression operates in subjugating animals. This is 
perhaps not surprising since animal rights history in the US has ties to abolitionism; the 
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA) was founded shortly after the 
Civil War by those with abolitionist ties (Davis). However, recent invocations of civil 
rights discourse (by groups like PETA) that, for instance, compare chattel slavery and 
factory farming further reinscribe links between the subordinated status of racialized 
people and that of animals, even as they may seek to ascribe personhood broadly. These 
comparisons unwittingly repeat rhetorics of dehumanization that date back to the 
Enlightenment and then draw human-animal connections only through a disempowered 
commonality of oppression and injustice. As the writers in this project demonstrate, 
productive and salutary human-animal associations instead emerge more fully through 
routes like the avowal of empowered commonalities, kinship-based perspectives, and 
through an appreciation for radical otherness. 
This project engages with animal studies, critical race scholarship, and most 
extensively with recent literature that takes up intersectional approaches to the animal 
question. Critically, in recent years animal studies as a field in the academic humanities 
has been (in large part) colorblind in its approach to envisioning interspecies relationships 
that point toward a posthuman future. Although the landscape is changing since critics 
like Zakiyyah Iman Jackson, Maneesha Deckha, Bénédicte Boisseron, Tiffany Lethabo 
King, Alexander Weheliye, and Che Gossett take issue with posthumanism’s 
presumption that we are past race, and particularly “past blackness in our considerations” 
of a universal human subject that can transcend its troubled relationship with the 
nonhuman world (Boisseron xxi). These scholars resolutely stake out ground around 
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black and brown subjects, resisting calls to venture forward into the mythical white 
posthuman. Instead, they seek connections that evade the Enlightenment human/animal 
dichotomy and, through a reconceptualization of the human, rediscover the multivarious 
ways of relating with those who share the planet. 
By reading early-twentieth-century literature through this critical lens, 
connections between people and animals emerge that refute adherence to Euroamerican 
rationalist models of human-nonhuman understanding. Instead, ways of appreciating 
interspecies connection, and of understanding animals through terms not prescribed by 
hierarchical epistemologies, come forth and reveal how histories of racialization and 
animalization are deeply entangled, especially in post-slavery, post-Darwin, post-
allotment America. The United States with its settler colonial histories of Native 
American genocide and African enslavement alongside the prescribed mass murder of 
endemic animals is particularly illustrative of the power of dominating ideologies to 
create persons who possess the right to subjugate or destroy those who are not granted 
personhood. Literary representations make appreciable the work of narrative in 
constructing the categories of human and nonhuman, as they also depict histories of 
racialization and animalization co-constituting one another.  
This dissertation takes up recent conversations in posthumanism and animal 
studies that investigate not only the animal, but the human as well. Since posthumanist 
and animal studies critically intend to move beyond the human, or to decenter its 
triumphant place, it has proved problematic that the theories they engage and produce 
often imply “the human” to be a uniform category. In its broadest sense, the category of 
“the human” discursively implies an even and broadly applicable species label that 
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distinguishes “us” from other animals. It suggests a collective uniformity among 
individuals eligible for inclusion in its seemingly distinct ontological territory. Its legal, 
political, and philosophical applications defend the notion of—if not a superior 
subjectivity—then a distinct one at least. But as is excessively plain to those who 
experience the social, material, and political unevenness of the category “human,” this 
term is not only inadequate in reflecting its varied applications, but it also functions as a 
means of determining uneven executions of justice. The conceptual “human” in the 
twentieth century, as Sylvia Wynter notes, becomes overrepresented by the “hegemonic 
ethnoclass” of the Western white Man (262). Some critical race scholars object to 
posthumanism’s frequent elisions of “alternative versions of humanity,” meaning those 
who are not Western, white, and male (Weheliye 10). As scholars like Wynter and 
Weheliye describe, the human in Western thought is its own sort of species, not an 
absolute category. Weheliye’s examination of black feminist theories of what it means to 
be human observe that the fields of posthumanism and animal studies widely “presume 
that we have now entered a stage in human development where all subjects have been 
granted equal access to western humanity and that this is, indeed, what we all want to 
overcome” (10). Weheliye explains that the privilege to move beyond this designation is 
one available to those already in possession of its myriad exclusionary benefits. Rather 
than move beyond, Weheliye suggests a “focus on how humanity has been imagined and 
lived by those subjects excluded” from the domain of the “liberal humanist figure of 
Man” (8). An examination of different epistemologies, outside the domain of “the 
human,” provides a way of tearing open the category without denying its potential to 
transform its meaning.  
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Just as the “the human” functions often in critical discourse as a uniform category, 
the terms “animal” and “nonhuman animal” adopt this same lack of specificity 
determined by categorization. Recent work in posthumanism posits that humanism (or the 
humanist project), despite its multidirectionality and depth, nevertheless fails to explicate 
or emancipate the human, premised as it is on ideas of humanity as the hierarchical apex 
in creaturely being. Thus, studies of the “nonhuman animal,” often investigate animals 
from the vantage of an always present lack. Cary Wolfe writes that the human, in fact, 
remains the central orienting axis for understanding “the alterity of the nonhuman” (169). 
This signifier—“nonhuman animal”—for creatures of every stripe attempts to imply at 
once that, in fact, humans are by default thought of as animals so that the unqualified 
term “animal” might cause confusion, while it also suggests that animals may now be 
understood as unified beings in their nonhumanness. While this may long have been the 
implied meaning of the term “animal,” posthumanism now articulates this human 
deficiency as embedded in progressive discourse.  
Similarly, more recent inquiry into the structure and function of language as 
determining thoughts about what it is to be animal, human, or thing suggests that 
language de-animates animals and thus empowers humanity by granting it greater 
vibrancy. In Animacies, Mel Y. Chen argues that “the figurative substitution of a human 
with an animal figure often accomplishes” an actual “displacement” of the human to what 
may be considered less animate states, or accomplishes a form of objectification (44). 
Chen identifies “humanity’s partners in definitional crime” to be “animality (as its 
analogue or limit)” and “race” (3). Thus, race is often animalized, while animality is 
invoked to define that which is not human. Claire Jean Kim also unravels the ways that 
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discourses around species are always implicated or inseparable from discourses of race 
when she argues that race has always been constructed as “a metric of animality, as a 
classification system that orders human bodies according to how animal they are” (18). 
Building on work by these scholars and others, this project engages animal representation 
at the start of the modernist period in America to observe how race influences these 
depictions, and how race intersects with routes that avoid the Human as end point. 
Looking to early-twentieth-century American literature offers an especially 
instructive vantage point for reading race alongside the animal for many reasons, not least 
of which is the fact that animalizing racism marked the time period so prominently. At 
the same time, formal innovations of the modernist period invited explorations into 
articulating nonhuman being, and enabled an articulation of human animality through 
language and poetics. Following in the wake of Darwin’s theorizations on the evolution 
of all species, including human beings, artistic investigations of adaptation, 
transformation, and human continuity with the rest of the living world became modernist 
concerns. Meanwhile, the period marks the moment just prior to the anthropocene with 
its defining consequence of global mass species extinction through hunting, fishing, and 
colonization all made possible through technological expansion.2 Moreover, the first forty 
years of the twentieth century constitute a time in the US when animals disappear quickly 
from people’s everyday experiences as urban migration and industrialization increase, so 
that encounters become less frequent and more peculiar. Fewer animal encounters 
coincident with aesthetic investigations into ‘the animal question’ emerge within a 
history that was also witness to the publication of literature promoting scientific racism 
                                                 
2 Scientists mark 1950 as the start of the anthropocene (Carrington). 
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and primitivism that, for instance, equated black people with apes.3 In this context, I look 
at the ways that writers of color denied not a connection to animals, but instead proffered 
subtle and overt critiques of the racist underpinnings of political, scientific, and social 
structures in America that used animal subordination as an integral tool of racism. 
Connection between human and animal is troubled by these histories, and yet, as the 
writers in this project show, animals offer opportunities for interspecies intimacies that 
spotlight the perverted machinations of Euroamerican subordinating hierarchies, pointing 
toward the possibility of their eventual dismantling.   
This dissertation reads Zora Neale Hurston’s Their Eyes Were Watching God 
(1937), Zitkala-Ša’s Old Indian Legends (1901), and a small sample of Anita Scott 
Coleman’s writing (1926 and 1938) as literature that complicates understandings of what 
it is to be human, animal, and (less stably) both. These writers assert a rebuke to settled 
notions about the human/animal binary and other hierarchical categories. While the three 
chapters in this dissertation explore different intersections between humans, animals, 
histories, and traditions, and thus do not rotate around a single axis of study, they all 
maintain a focus on boundary-making and dissolution at the juncture of race and 
animality. By reading animals in three early twentieth-century works, this project 
approaches the convergence of animals and race specifically in African-American and 
Native-American literatures. While certainly other racialized literatures have historical 
contexts around animalization which warrant theorization and analysis, the rationale for 
                                                 
3 This racism manifested in myriad ways, as when in 1906 the Bronx Zoo held a human zoo exhibit which 
caged a 23-year-old Congolese man alongside an orangutan and a chimpanzee (Keller). That same man, 
Ota Benga, had been part of a 1904 exhibit at the St. Louis World’s Fair that replicated traditional 
dwellings of Africans, Eskimos, and Native Americans (Keller). The staging of race and precolonial 
lifeways as consumptive displays points to a Euroamerican consumption of nonwhite bodies in its 
production of “civilized” empire—literally and metaphorically.  
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such a choice here is twofold. First, African-American literature was prominent and 
influential within modernism and offers much material for study, as does Native 
literature. Second, and more importantly, animalization as a tool of dehumanization has 
been a prominent means of oppression used against black and indigenous people 
throughout the history of the United States. Black/white as the organizing binary of the 
American racial imaginary means that racialization happens in its most extreme forms 
along this axis. For Native Americans, racialization and extinction through genocide have 
been historically related concepts and practices of control instituted by whites in the US. 
Native Americans have also been animalized through essentializing imaginaries that 
placed them closer to nature and the nonhuman world (Kim 43-44).  
Histories of racialization that include animality as part of the racial matrix are 
relevant when reading both representations of race and representations of animals 
because by disentangling them, the constructions of both become more clearly visible. At 
the same time, through literatures that emerge in specific cultural contexts where animals 
function differently, their depictions demonstrate ways of encountering the human and 
the animal outside of the Euroamerican white positionality to which modernism often 
defaults. As Kirby Brown observes in a 2017 article on “New Modernist Studies’ ‘Indian 
Problem,’” early-twentieth-century formal and thematic innovations by Native writers 
and academia’s “increasing attention” to Indian production, philosophy, and myriad 
frameworks still “have not had an appreciable impact on the field’s engagement with 
American Indian writing” (289). Disappointingly, modernist studies continues to be a 
very white field, which Michael Bibby asserts as inherently “structural” to the field—a 
field he understands to be fundamentally “a racial formation of whiteness” (487). This is 
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not to say that the field cannot be transformed nor that much literature that has 
historically been excluded will remain so, but it does explain why nearly all studies of the 
animal in modernist texts focus on white authors and perspectives. Still, for this reason, I 
am hesitant to invoke modernism as the heading under which the works in this 
dissertation fall; early twentieth-century literature seems a more apt descriptor for writing 
that clearly counters a formation of whiteness. 
The second chapter of this project reviews the critical landscape in terms of 
scholarly investigations that center race and multicultural histories in the United States as 
entangled with constructions of the animal and animality. Analyses that issue calls for 
posthumanism and animal studies to permanently integrate race into their interpretive 
matrices also constitute a significant portion of this introductory chapter. Decka’s work 
that calls for postcolonial feminist approaches to animal studies, Jackson’s appeal for 
posthumanism to move away from its Enlightenment rationalist foundations, Weheliye’s 
theorizations of the human that draw on the work of Hortense Spillers and Sylvia Wynter, 
and Lethabo-King’s indictments of posthumanist discursive violence all inform this 
chapter’s approach to reading the animal as constructed through or around racialized 
experience. Noting work on modernist representations of animals, going back to Margot 
Norris, Carrie Rohman, and Christopher Peterson, this chapter looks at interpretations of 
the animal as integral to being human, and assesses how race has been invoked or 
obscured in earlier scholarship. Reading Anita Scott Coleman’s short story “Three Dogs 
and a Rabbit” and her poem “Idle Wonder” provides an opportunity for considering 
African-American constructions of personhood adjacent to situations of contact with 
animals that either confer humanity or rupture notions of the animal. This chapter goes on 
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to chronicle work that engages questions of race and the animal in other fields or literary 
periods, and traces the roots of thinking through these questions, back to Frantz Fanon, 
Aimé Césaire, Achille Mbembe, and Derrida. 
The next chapter examines the varied depictions of animals in Hurston’s Their 
Eyes Were Watching God, charting how voice adheres or vanishes according to an animal 
character’s proximity to the community. In a novel examined extensively from feminist 
and critical race perspectives that find Janie’s acquisition of her own voice and of the 
narrative itself either laudable, incomplete, or illusory, and analyses which also attend to 
Hurston’s use of dialect as innovative and praiseworthy or disparaging and suggestive of 
minstrelsy, voice is a central concern within the novel. This chapter looks at how 
Hurston’s particular interest in animals manifests in this context. Scholars like Sharon 
Davie observe that animal worlds within the novel “pull the cultural rug from under the 
readers’ feet” by disordering a sense of mastery humans may have over the world (446). 
Matt Bonner’s mule, the wake of buzzards that consumes his remains, and the rabid dog 
that bites Tea Cake all figure differently and with variously elaborated communication 
systems. Animal voice, acceptance, and killability hinge, in some ways, on the discourses 
they deploy. This chapter also follows Tea Cake’s seeming transformation from man to 
“mad dog” after the rabid dog bites him and transfers the rabies virus. While this 
transmission suggests a living, cellular continuity between man and dog, the events that 
follow his infection, in effect, work to dehumanize Tea Cake in the eyes of the white 
justice system that acquits Janie for killing him. Hurston’s depiction of an exasperated 
(and silenced) Black community during the trial scene, alongside Janie’s exoneration, 
contests not the outcome of the verdict, but its basis that relied on a dehumanized Tea 
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Cake as killable. The novel makes plain the white judicial system’s entrenched history of 
dehumanization as a means of rationalizing (or prescribing) death. Ultimately, language 
and voice emerge as troublingly deceptive, with the novel’s final pages providing space 
for the alterity of silence. 
 The fourth chapter considers Zitkala-Ša’s Old Indian Legends as a text that 
disputes notions of human superiority—and in fact of discrete human ontologies—
through a combination of narrative and image that depict a world in which bodily forms 
alter interchangeably. Zitkala-Ša’s interpretive translations of Dakota oral stories read 
alongside Angel De Cora’s illustrations, which were included in the original 1901 
publication, suggest human-nonhuman relationships to be essential to human life and 
connection to the world. Rather than threatening or devaluing, interchanges between 
humans and animals in the Legends point to kinship relationships between humans and 
nonhumans as constructive in the absence of species hierarchical ordering. Settler 
colonial depredation, allotment policies, and assimilation attempts are all metaphorized in 
this text that uses animal characters to enact human moral lessons around ethical 
behavior. Animality functions as a means of reversing anti-Indian racism in that animal 
characters who stand in for colonial agents are more emphatically and physically 
animalized. The story “The Badger and the Bear,” for instance, describes a starving bear, 
once fed and strengthened by the badgers’ hospitality, stealing their home and installing 
his own family. The bear’s fur, paws, teeth, and unpredictable temper are all emphasized, 
while the badgers are depicted as more physically human. The antagonist characters 
guilty of greed, conquest, and lack of respect for the natural world are cast as not just 
more distinctly animal, but as trapped within a more rigid and inescapable bodily form. 
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The stories present a Dakota worldview that seeks justice through alliances with nature 
and between species, just as they demonstrate how a sense of relationality that functions 
through ideas of fluidity and non-hierarchy provides a means of enacting sensible 
coexistence with the rest of the living world. 
Finally, the literature this dissertation reads ultimately asks more questions of the 
animal than it hazards to answer. Coleman’s speaker speculates on the inner life of her 
housecat as she entertains the notion she may experience life in a way that mirrors that of 
a Black acquaintance who works as a housemaid, and whose employers assume her to be 
perfectly content in her isolation, just as the speaker assumes her cat to be. Hurston 
conjures an ornate ceremony the buzzards perform before the consumption of a mule that 
had received a town funeral upon its passing, so accepted was it by the townspeople. 
These scenes point to the potential for communal human-animal relationships and also to 
the unknowability of animal rituals and minds. Tea Cake’s illness, which leaves him 
subject to the label “mad dog,” provokes questions about the social, psychological, and 
political processes involved in efforts to dehumanize, to sanction killing through 
animalization, and to speak for another. Zitkala-Ša’s stories pose conceptual and spiritual 
contentions that humans possess continuity with the rest of animal life, as these stories 
also question the sustainability of a culture that seeks hierarchical seclusion at the 
imagined top of an evolutionary chain. More questions, though they may not provide 
answers, do I hope point to the multidimensional complexities that rationalistic 
approaches to the animal efface, which then all too often enable violence and erasure. In 
the present moment in which the precariousness of much life on earth becomes ever more 
so, the flourishing of questions about the animal and the nature of its subordinate 
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construction suggest that curiosity and interest offer the strongest possibilities for altering 





CATEGORICAL INTERSECTIONS: WHERE RACIALIZATION  
AND ANIMALIZATION MEET 
As of yet, the intersections of race, environmental justice, and animal studies have 
not been adequately addressed within modernist studies. Given how race directly figures 
into the animalizing ontologies that many modernist texts explore, focusing on how 
racialization and animalization intersect with modernist themes and aesthetics promises 
to reveal much about both of these constructions. Such investigations offer several 
promising outcomes. In addition to highlighting how modernist aesthetics that ostensibly 
elide race in depictions of animals actually work to reinscribe binary oppositions between 
humans and animals, studies that read race and animality as co-constructs offer a means 
of unravelling those entanglements while also locating the presence of interspecies 
alliances that resist white hegemonic subordination. This essay explores the need in 
modernist studies for a deeper critical engagement with how representations of animals 
and animality intersect with conceptions of race, and it also assesses work that examines 
these intersections in different fields outside of modernist studies.  
A Review and a Reading 
In looking at the intersections of race, species, and modernism, this essay will 
track a few key threads. First, it will review recent critical calls for more scholarship to 
investigate how the dehumanizing and animalizing work of racialization influences ideas 
about not only the animal, but “the human” as a universal construct as well. I then look at 
scholarly approaches to reading animals in modernist literature, reviewing how some 
studies have asked us to conceive of the animal through specific formal and thematic 
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depictions in modernism. Since many of these analyses, with notable exceptions, such as 
Christopher Peterson’s Bestial Traces, focus on the modernist productions of white 
writers, race is typically elided in those critical discussions, implying its invisibility in the 
human/animal imaginary. Since histories of racism necessarily shape how animals are 
rendered, I look at two pieces of writing by Anita Scott Coleman, a Harlem Renaissance 
writer who resided in the Western US and published in many of the period’s most 
influential African American periodicals. A short story and a poem of Coleman’s that 
centralize animal characters and trouble depictions of animality in distinct ways provide 
opportunities for thinking through race and the animal. This essay then goes on to look at 
work that extensively charts race as “a vector” (to borrow Claire Jean Kim’s term) that 
deeply influences representations of animals and real world relationships with them. It 
also looks at current work in animal studies and posthumanism, and at the postcolonial 
theoretical origins of scholarship that first interrogated the ways that human and animal 
subjugation emerged under colonialism. At the intersection of these two fields, in fact, 
sits a problem that until recently has maintained distance between the two fields: critical 
race theorists’ reluctance to embrace the animal or connections to it when full 
membership within the category of “the human” has yet to be granted to all people by the 
US nation state—socially, culturally, or politically. This essay will address that tension as 
well. 
The process of untangling how animal depictions are always deeply influenced by 
perspectives contingent on racialized positionality begins with the recognition that one 
does not apprehend an animal outside of a subject position—be it racialized or 
gendered—that influences how that animal is understood. Try as we might to recognize 
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the animal on its own terms, our cultural experience, language, history, place, subjective 
disposition, and many other factors besides cannot help but cloud our view of nonhuman 
beings and their possible experiences.1 Positionalities that induce us to see in certain 
ways are all the more complicated when histories of racialized animalization are part of 
one’s cultural and historical experience. And these histories—compounded by long-
standing exclusions from certain codified ways of understanding nonhuman life (via 
scientific study, for instance, or a recreational orientation to the natural world)—
necessarily affect how representations of animals differ because of racism. Furthermore, 
cultural contexts that vary accordingly by ethnicity have rich and specific dynamics 
through which human and animal relationships are conceived, which racialized histories 
may additionally shape. In beginning to work through the countless and nuanced ways 
that racial constructions have shaped ways of regarding animals, my hope is to further 
account for how subjugation and domination structure mainstream discourses of 
animality, while also finding routes around this authoritative centrum by reading works 
that render animals through race, perhaps reaching a place independent of white 
hegemony.  
The fields of animal studies, environmental humanities, posthumanism, modernist 
studies, and critical race studies all stand to gain from approaches that regard the 
interplay of animal representation and racialized experience as crucial to further 
recognizing how dehumanization functions symbolically and how it may be confronted. 
As mentioned, critical explorations of the animal in literary and cultural texts of the 
modern period remain limited in their considerations of the role race plays in influencing 
                                                 
1 One conception of animal experience is the Umwelt, a term proposed by Jakob von Uexküll. The very use 
of this idea in ascribing such an experience to animals is itself an example of Western conditioning. 
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animal representation and shaping thematic concerns with human animality. While recent 
critical attempts within modernist studies work to endorse animality, to protect animal 
lives, and to embrace the human as animal, they still commonly run up steadily against 
scholarly efforts oriented around critical race theory that work to reject animality and its 
associated reductions in subjective status. This conflict reflects what Zakiyyah Iman 
Jackson observes to be “the analytical challenges posed by the categories of race, 
colonialism, and slavery” that saturate discourses around the animal (671). Meanwhile, 
scholars interested in racialized experiences and representations in modernism have not 
eagerly approached nonhuman depictions either because they (perhaps) find 
examinations of political, social, linguistic, formal, and cultural features of such texts to 
be more productive. Although the nonhuman can be seen lingering slyly or prominently 
within each of these realms, attention to the work of race is still predominantly aimed at 
examining human relationships. Owing to this tendency, Jinthana Haritaworn warns that 
“there is a certain temptation to scapegoat critical race theorists as anthropocentric, 
correlationist dupes of the species binary with an irrational investment in humanity” 
(212). Such scapegoating inclinations, however, fail to appreciate the complexity that 
histories of dehumanization impart for people of color, so that writers and critics of color 
must contend with these histories when considering alliances with nonhuman subjects. 
But this complexity offers an opportunity for great potential in reading animal depictions 
by nonwhite writers, particularly as a way of seeing around whiteness as a filter and for 
appreciating how dehumanization and devaluation continue to go undetected in dominant 
cultural and discursive practices. 
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Calls for more work on the junctures between race and critical animal studies 
have emerged with greater frequency in the last several years, as a more sustained critical 
look at “the human” has opened alternative spaces for imagining animals via routes that 
venture away from a rationalist, Enlightenment-oriented perspective. Work by scholars 
like Jackson, Maneesha Deckha, Tiffany Lethabo King, Alexander Weheliye, and Che 
Gossett look at how forms of oppression that hold down people of color operate by 
similar logics as those that subjugate the nonhuman world. But more than this—since 
such analytical approaches date back to the 1980s with the works of Carol Adams and 
Marjorie Spiegel—current research adopts Sylvia Wynter’s call to scrutinize a formerly 
unexamined investment in the discursive deployment of broad terms like “the human.” 
Recent work by Bénédicte Boisserson also looks to “interspecies connectedness” forged 
by racialized histories that emerge through solidarity rather than through experiences of 
debased comparison (xx). 
Since animal studies as a disciplinary field emerges most prominently as a branch 
of posthumanism, “the human” that the field seeks to leave behind still stalks about as a 
consistent sign against which animals are understood.2 For the posthuman to fully 
embrace its animal self—to disassemble the structures of anthropocentrism, and to 
reassign itself a more equitable place within the larger nonhuman world—its drive to 
leave behind its former self must first reconcile the fact that “the human’s” jumping off 
point already assumes “mastery, autonomy, and dominance” in the world (Jackson 671). 
                                                 
2 Cary Wolfe, for instance, insists that posthumanism is “posthumanist” in its rejection of humanism’s 
goals of escaping the animality and the materiality of human embodiment (xv). Thus, posthumanism 
resituates the human as animal. Jacques Derrida, in his poststructuralist work that that examines human 
embeddedness in language systems that reinscribe Western humanism, at the end of his career explored the 
animal as a discursive figure and as a being outside of language. His inquiries advanced animal studies as a 
disciplinary focus within the humanities. 
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Theoretical calls for a posthuman future, such as those made by Cary Wolfe, Matthew 
Calarco, or Neil Badmington, often implicitly presume that all humans inhabit 
comparable positions within that category. Yet for such an assumption to be possible, all 
other positions within that category must go unnoticed or appear invisible by those 
resting comfortably on a humanistic foundation of power.  
For the most part, posthumanism’s theoretical take-off position is already 
grounded in the domain of the Enlightenment human by its founders who implicitly use 
the (presumably white) Western subject as equivalent to the universalized “human.” To 
cite a more explicit example of this sleight of hand, Deleuze and Guattari’s exploratory 
considerations of what it means to become animal state that “relationships between 
animals are bound up with the relations between man and animal, man and woman…man 
and the physical and microphysical universe,” underscoring not only a gendered 
distinction between who occupies the place of “human,” but also declaring that man 
meets the animal first and has a notable relationship with the universe (235). They go on 
to claim that “societies, even primitive societies” engage in becomings in order to finally 
“reduce them [animals]” to symbols (248). Implicit in this hierarchizing of societies that 
generalizes the relationships between “primitive” communities and animals is an 
assumption of Western knowing that lays claim to understanding how all humans 
encounter animals, with such declarations made from within a Western philosophical 
enclosure. In response, criticism has mounted in recent years against posthumanism as a 
field that has (for the most part) sidestepped questions of race in its move to envision 
theoretical (and potentially realizable) modes of living beyond the constraints of 
contemporary humanism. Critics (such as Jackson, Deckha, Lethabo King, Weheliye, and 
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Gossett) charge that such an elision fails on a number of grounds to recognize the 
inequity of an appeal to work towards posthumanism when many people globally and in 
the United States have yet to be accorded full human status, socially or politically.   
As a field, posthumanism remains invested in both a beyond-human borrowed 
from Haraway’s cyborg sense—a technological idea of progress towards lives and worlds 
unlimited by bodily fallibility—and in a beyond-human that does not anticipate 
teleological progress, but instead seeks to take apart the ideological structuring apparatus 
of anthropocentrism. The latter—which most prominently emerges under the critical 
awning of animals studies—is of interest here, though scholars’ charges of color-
blindness apply to both arms of the field.3 As I will explore, such blind spots go often 
unremarked in animal studies, where discourses on animals often assume a universal 
“human” as a counter-referent to animals, and where disjunctions of power go 
unrecognized. Thus, connections between the categories of race, animal, and human still 
demand to be exposed and ruptured, particularly in modernist studies.  
Modernist Studies, Race, and the Animal Question 
The entanglements of race, gender, and the animal are most productively 
encountered when taken together by scholars who explicitly acknowledge that race and 
gender cannot be set aside as separable constructs that do not influence how we 
apprehend the nonhuman world. And recognition of the ways that modernity maintains 
and reproduces existing structures, though racism, sexism, and capitalism among other 
forces is necessary if a genuine re-authorship of what it means to be human is to take 
hold. Thus, looking to literature that not only radically reimagines what narrative looks 
                                                 
3 Posthumanism with an interest in deconstructing anthropocentrism coincides with a number of distinct 
fields, including new materialism, object-oriented ontology, animal studies, and ecocriticism. 
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like, but also comes forward at a temporal cusp of sorts (as modernity accelerates and 
gains the seemingly unassailable momentum it maintains today) seems rich with the 
potential for insights on and new ways of thinking through the human, the animal, and 
the myths they promote and dispel.  
Engaging with modernism and early-twentieth-century literature asks that we look 
at how modernist representation in texts not only devises new formal approaches to 
animal subjects, but also engages in fundamentally new ways with the figure and 
subjectivity of the human as an animal being. Since modernist and early-twentieth-
century literature “straddles the legacies of Enlightenment rationalism and Darwinian 
revelations,” as Carrie Rohman observes, it engages—often radically—with the idea that 
animals have conscious lives, and that humans are animals as well (57). Nonhumans (and 
humans as animals) occupy significant textual territory in works by white canonical 
modernists like Ernest Hemingway, William Faulkner, Virginia Woolf, Franz Kafka, 
Joseph Conrad, Djuna Barnes, Marianne Moore, D.H. Lawrence, and H.G. Wells, all of 
whose writings animal studies scholars have taken up in examination of signifying and 
material practices around animals and animality.  
Yet modernist texts emerging historically in the wake of not only Enlightenment 
philosophy and Darwinian instantiation, but also in the post-Reconstruction era as well, 
require a greater investment in analyses of nonhuman representation as inflected by 
racialized logics. During the Reconstruction period—marked as it was by scientific 
racism, political and social exclusion, and the beastialization of black men which 
contributed to lynchings and white mob action—racializing narratives that invoked 
animality as a tool of oppression became part of the national racial imaginary. 
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Modernism, coming on the heels of Reconstruction, confronts these narratives with 
challenges both subtle and overt. The omission, however, of race as a critical 
consideration among animal studies scholars in modernist studies is to some extent 
understandable since critics like Henry Louis Gates Jr. have exerted significant critical 
energy unravelling metaphorical associations between “slave/animal” and Great Chain of 
Being dictums that represented black people as “the lowest of the human races or as first 
cousin to the ape” (173, 181). And, as Alexander Weheliye notes, since “full access to 
legal personhood has been a systematic absence” for people of color, scholars studying 
the literary productions of ethnically marginalized people have hesitated in taking up 
posthumanism and studies of animal representation within a larger context of biopolitical 
dehumanization (11).  
Depictions of animals in modernist literary productions by writers of color invites 
scholarship that investigates how legacies of dehumanization imbue these 
representations. Such work promises to shed further light on racialization as a process of 
dehumanization that instrumentalizes animals and animality to render lives less or 
invaluable by white sociocultural actors. More promising yet, however, is the potential 
for such studies to examine how individual writers imagine unique representations of 
animals within the climate of modernism’s myriad innovations. Zora Neale Hurston’s 
canonical Their Eyes Were Watching God includes a vast array of animal agents—a 
notable mule, a rabid dog, a flock of buzzards, and creatures endemic to the Everglades—
that function metaphorically for human characters within the novel, and also assume their 
own agency within the text, such that they stretch its formal and linguistic limits beyond 
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the terms the novel seemingly sets forth.4 Assuming a relevance of their own, Hurston’s 
animals move beyond anthropocentrism, or conversely (as in the depiction of the 
buzzards) become embellishments of anthropocentrism to such a degree that they render 
the anthros strange or other. While critics have engaged with Hurston’s Their Eyes at 
length, only Sharon Davie (writing in 1993) devotes considerable attention to the worlds 
that animals open up within the novel. Since the book depicts a variety of nonhumans in 
strikingly different ways, it warrants the sort of critical attention that scholars of animal 
studies in modernism have lavished on white writers of the period.  
In the last ten years, for instance, a number of books that take up depictions of 
animals in modernist works have appeared on the critical scene, almost all examining the 
work of white writers. Even earlier, Margot Norris’s Beasts of the Modern Imagination 
(1985) was the first to take up animals in the works of writers like Kafka, Lawrence, and 
Hemingway, claiming that their fictional animals were extensions of their own human 
animality. Significantly, Norris observes that our conceptions of animals developed in 
dialectic opposition to the false assumption that human beings are unique creators of 
culture (3). This observation stands decades later as a “problem” that scholars in animal 
studies still contend with as one that requires critical unpacking; it serves often as an 
analytical starting point, from which scholars proceed to demonstrate how literary 
depictions collapse these binaries. A series of monographs published more recently each 
confront animals in modernist literature as signified beings that manage to rupture their 
own signs. Philip Armstrong’s What Animals Mean in the Fiction of Modernity (2008) 
approaches modernism as a literary movement with a long reach, and reads the works of 
                                                 
4 Animals appear with frequency in much of Hurston’s work, even in short pieces like the story “Sweat” 
which features a snake as an agent of vengeance a wife deploys against her abusive husband; the story 
appeared in the magazine FIRE!! in 1926. 
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Jonathan Swift up through J.M. Coetzee in an effort to “locate the ‘tracks’ left by 
animals” in literature (3). He contends that modernity as a sociocultural force reshapes 
human and animal relationships so that conquest, followed by nostalgia for nature, 
followed finally by a disavowal of rationalism serve as the primary route modernity 
determines for humans as they regard animals; and in the end, he argues, sympathy for 
nonhumans eventually prevails. Carrie Rohman’s Stalking the Subject: Modernism and 
the Animal (2009) charts closely how writers like Lawrence, Barnes, and Wells represent 
animal subjectivity through new forms that resist the sorts of categorical discourse that 
formerly foreclosed questions of individual animal experience (17). Furthermore, she 
argues that texts like Nightwood reimagine human subjectivity as fundamentally 
nonhuman; she argues the novel “stages a recuperation of animality” in what may be “the 
most complex and atypical portrait of animality in modernist literature” (26). Since Robin 
Vote appears as a subject who does not succumb to the terms and logic of language as a 
means of defining her own subjectivity, Rohman states that Barnes erupts the animal 
question beyond the limited means language provides us in confronting it.  
Although many more extended studies of animal representation in literature and 
film have come into print in the last decades, only a few focus on early-twentieth-century 
literature or modernism. And while a number of volumes approach modernist literature 
from an ecocritical or posthumanist perspective in a way that draws the animal question 
into focus, it still remains a largely peripheral concern within conversations that deal 
more centrally with larger environmental contexts. Meanwhile, since Norris, Armstrong, 
and Rohman focus their attention on literature produced exclusively by white writers, 
they in turn circumvent examinations of how race informs animal representation, and 
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thus they tend to universalize the conceptions of the human that they write against. An 
exception to this pattern is Christopher Peterson’s Bestial Traces: Race, Sexuality, 
Animality (2013), which looks at how racist and antiracist discourses operate through a 
disavowal of the animal. Peterson takes a temporally broad approach to texts—reading 
Edgar Allen Poe, Coetzee, and Richard Wright, among others—and so does not center 
modernism specifically in his analyses. Instead he reads texts to locate the extent to 
which even antiracist arguments and language rely on a “repudiation of animality” (2). 
That racism seeks to dehumanize, Peterson writes, means that it operates as “a 
fundamental disavowal of human animality” (7). That is to say, when animality is refused 
as an integral aspect of human being, a hierarchical relationship to animal others is the 
inevitable result, and when race is animalized, this hierarchy is maintained. Peterson 
contends that human/animal hierarchical binarism maintains racism through a “pejorative 
metaphorics that animal alterity provides” (8). Ultimately, he champions a less hostile 
relationship to alterity, suggesting that literary depictions make clear that in Western 
contexts, otherness provokes violence and mortal devaluation. 
Studies then that take on race and figurations of the animal in modernist literature 
remain limited to a few articles or chapters that catalogue how dehumanization structures 
the lives of racialized people and nonhuman animals. In his reading of Native Son, 
Peterson notes how Bigger’s portrayal as a violent black man spurred reviews at the time 
that likened black men to beasts. But Peterson notes how Wright’s novel emphasizes 
white dehumanization of black men as the central conditioning force of his behavior. 
Matthew Lambert, also writing about Native Son, proposes that Wright’s use of animals 
in the novel—particularly rats—critiques the racist ideologies and material conditions 
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that deterministically limited the socioeconomic potential of African Americans in 1930s 
America. Through the figure of the rat, African American environmental confinement to 
slums is made clear—not only by the presence of rats, but by the fact that rats can slip 
into other neighborhoods undetected, while Bigger cannot. But what’s more, animals 
assume a place of dignity despite the precarity they withstand. The rat in the novel’s 
opening pages demonstrates a “dramatic ferocity” that illustrates the creature’s 
“strangeness” in a way that evokes empathy in the reader (81-82). Lambert writes that the 
novel demonstrates how all beings connect through “a kind of unknowability,” and 
finally illustrates how struggles against both racialized and anthropocentric “containment 
practices” are connected (78, 88).  
Additionally, though she does not take up questions of race, Christina Colvin’s 
analyses of animals in modernist texts also find representations of strangeness to be 
central to the modernist project. With work on both Faulkner and Moore, she identifies 
how encounters with animal alterity are made even stranger by the “unnatural” conditions 
of modernity (3). Also writing about Moore, Cliff Mak states that her representational 
approach was authoritative in a way that did not assume “the territorializing self-
importance of her male peers,” but instead engaged in “pluralistic, feminist 
intertextuality” (874). For Mak, an embrace of a comedic sensibility guides Moore’s 
curious approach to animal poetics. And Vanessa Robinson, also writing about Moore 
claims that modernism’s focus on interiority and an examination of the self actually led to 
“a new respect for nonhuman alterity” when rather odd things were found to stand at the 
limits of language. That Moore provides much material to scholars of modernism looking 
toward animal representation—and that Barnes also provides radical ways of reading 
29 
animal and human consciousness—emphasizes how gender figures significantly into the 
nonhuman imaginary in American modernist texts. This makes sense given that women’s 
partial exclusion from the human category and a more socially acceptable (and expected) 
orientation toward emotion and sympathy might open up alternative ways of articulating 
animality.  
Anita Scott Coleman’s Writing 
While much work in modernist studies around the animal question has thus 
looked at white writers of the traditional canon, greater potential awaits scholars of race, 
animality, and animal representation who choose to engage with texts of the Harlem 
Renaissance as well as those from Native writers of the period. Writers who have long 
been overlooked are justifiably looked to first for a project that aims to challenge systems 
of domination and categorization. Anita Scott Coleman is one such writer whose work 
approaches the multidimensionality of animal representation alongside experiences of 
race weighed down by histories of dehumanization. Coleman’s work suggests new 
possibilities for appreciating how reading race alongside questions of the animal (and 
reading animals while always considering racial constructions) opens ways of thinking 
around white normativity. Her short story “Three Dogs and a Rabbit” (1926) illustrates 
how race and animality are always ensnared in a Eurocentric American culture that seeks 
to devour nonwhite bodies. The story—one of her best-known works as a Harlem 
Renaissance writer—was an entry Coleman submitted to an annual fiction contest held by 
The Crisis for which she won third prize.5 It approaches the connection between human 
and animal as one that consists in both a shared emotional vocabulary and a shared 
                                                 
5 It was judged second place by H.G. Wells, who served on the contest judging panel along with Sinclair 
Lewis, Charles Chestnutt, and Mary White Ovington (Davis and Mitchell 23). 
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vulnerability to forces of dehumanizing domination, such that it insists on a reading of 
animality and race as co-constituting positions of violent debasement by forces of white 
domination. Interestingly, the story also points to an early-twentieth-century concern 
among black writers with representations of animals that differ markedly from other 
modernist depictions. The story describes a symmetry between a man and a rabbit that 
discursively merges their forms as a way of imagining a phenomenological connection 
between the two, while more critically illustrating how white sympathy seeks 
sentimentalized animals as it also creates bestialized humans.  
In the story, a black girl enslaved by a white family travelling west rescues a 
rabbit from their three hounds sent to chase down dinner after some hungry days on the 
trail. The girl, observing the chase, catches the “terror-mad” rabbit when it bounds into 
her lap (91). She fends off the dogs and hides the animal in her skirt pocket even as her 
captor beats her when she claims not to know where the rabbit had gone. Observing this 
horrific scene, the master’s son “changed from that day” and later went on to marry the 
girl (92). Years later as an old woman, she is Mrs. Ritton, called to the witness stand for 
her part in harboring a black man fleeing three policemen. The third-person frame 
narrative appears largely in quotations as the listener/narrator quotes Timothy Phipps at 
length as he tells the tale. Phipps goes on to quote Mrs. Ritton at length in the verbal 
testimony she gives that relates the stories of both the rabbit and the fleeing man (who 
turns out to be Phipps, as the last line of the story reveals). Following her statement to the 
assembled “Gentlemen” in the courtroom in which she explains that her husband taught 
her “to forget the scars of serfdom” and to enjoy “the joys of freedom,” Phipps interrupts 
the narrative and her testimony to praise the “little old white-haired woman standing 
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alone” in “her loveliness” captivating the room with “the power of her beauty” (92). The 
story thus ties together the construction of Mrs. Ritton’s personhood in the eyes of the 
courtroom (and the narrator) by entangling her beauty, her seeming whiteness, and her 
demonstration of courage and compassion for the hunted rabbit. Her protection of the 
animal had, after all, transformed her access to distinguished personhood, which she was 
granted through her marriage to Colonel Ritton, such that she is not even identified 
beyond that surname. It demonstrates how race, gender, and animality are invoked 
together to construct certain versions of what it means to be human in the eyes of the law 
and white heteropatriarchal culture. The story uses this confluence to then demonstrate 
how the conceptual gymnastics required to receive legal justice and a “fair trial” while 
black in America hinge on pushing the proper buttons to activate white sympathy. 
Paradoxically, those buttons light up for charismatic and docile animals, even while such 
creatures are also subject to various exploitative and inhumane actions by that same 
culture.  
The testimony resumes with Mrs. Ritton recalling that while sitting at home one 
day, she spied a black man fleeing three white policemen on foot, running down her 
street; as she describes from the witness stand, the man “who was running so wildly was 
only a little terror-mad rabbit”—he in fact “merged” and became one with the rabbit (93). 
The policemen, while three in number and chasing down “the rabbit” metaphorically 
correlate with the hounds, Mrs. Ritton explains that they and the mob that followed them 
all “had the visage of my master” (93). In the context of American and European histories 
of bestializing black men through comparisons to apes, animalization in this story 
partially inverts that logic by ascribing rabbit-like qualities to the man; he is little, 
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frightened, and outnumbered by beings ferocious and merciless, inhuman in their 
assumption of the master’s face. Animality here does not function as a means of 
“othering” in the service of subjugating, rather its intention is to humanize both the small 
animal and Phipps, and link them through experiences of vulnerability, unjust 
entrapment, and bad luck.  
On an impulse, Mrs. Ritton hides Phipps in her house when he bounds in, and like 
the rabbit, she never gives him over. These two acts are the consequence of “only two 
impulses” Mrs. Ritton ever answered, having not “been born so unfettered” as the white 
courtroom she addresses (89). The impulses and their consequent actions are protective, 
immediate, and responsive to life-threatening chases in which the hunted seem to lack 
any chance of escape. Yet this second impulse, because of its duplication of her 
protection of the “terror-mad rabbit” impulse, may be read as a repetition of the first—the 
immediate will to stand physically in the way of predation that hunts with hungry 
entitlement. “Three Dogs and a Rabbit” adopts animality as a means of engendering 
compassion in its gentlemanly audience, thereby inverting the dominating and oppressing 
ends that equating people with animals might otherwise pursue. Coleman’s story, as an 
example of the need to read beyond the narrowness of the canon, generatively 
demonstrates how race and animality collide to yield productive insights around 
enmeshed ontological constructions.  
Coleman’s story also exemplifies how exclusion from full acceptance within the 
category of “the human” enables the text’s two speakers to escape ways of seeing that are 
conditioned by Eurocentric fantasies of domination and supremacy. Yet they must both 
still navigate this terrain as a means of survival. Both the narrator and Mrs. Ritton in her 
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verbal testimony before a presumably white courtroom appeal not for recognition of their 
humanity vis-à-vis an ontologic equation with the white master or the policemen; instead 
both speakers turn away from “the human” and toward the rabbit as a redemptive counter 
figure to the unhinged ferocity of Man. Theoretical drives to move beyond, around, or 
within with the figure of the human (with the intent to disfigure it) prompt new readings 
of texts like Coleman’s that illustrate how people who inhabit historically disenfranchised 
positions have authored narratives that not only take place outside of the confined 
purview of “the human,” but that align solidarity with the nonhuman world as well. 
“Three Dogs and a Rabbit” illustrates how a steely protection of life in the face of white 
brutality and law enforcement depends on an impulse in which compassion eclipses fear. 
The story illustrates a connection between vulnerable individuals—both of them treated 
as prey by predatory creatures—and the propulsion to safeguard life because it is 
vulnerable. Yet the text attains this connection between a charismatic minor fauna and a 
fleeing man by traversing territories of animal sentimentality first.  
Coleman makes the route from animal to person even more explicit in some of her 
poetry, as in the poem “Idle Wonder” published in Opportunity in 1938.6 The short verse 
poem draws a comparison between human and animal as it muses about animal 
consciousness and the assumptions of those who rationalize oppression and possession. 
The poem’s speaker begins by pondering her cat and assuming that it leads a life of 
satisfaction, but then questions that assumption by drawing a comparison between the cat 
and the subjugated position of a black acquaintance: 
My cat is so sleek and contented;  
 She is a real house-cat  
                                                 
6 The only full collection of Coleman’s work published during her lifetime was a compilation of poetry 
titled Reason for Singing (1948); “Idle Wonder” appears in that collection.  
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She has not seen any other cat  
since she came to live with me. 
I wonder does she think,  
I wonder does she dream  
I wonder does she ever imagine  
Herself out, among cats  
I wonder is she like poor Agnes 
Agnes lives with the white folks  
And they think she is contented  
And actually delighted with being  
 their house-maid. (Coleman 202) 
The speaker begins by observing the cat’s figure and presumed satisfaction. Despite or 
because of the cat’s isolation from other felines, she is decreed authentic in her 
domesticated position; observed to be content and fit, she seemingly wants for little in the 
way of comforts or companionship, and so lives as she is meant to live. As the sentence 
runs on, it even suggests that her contentment correlates with a lack of contact with other 
cats, such that she can repose unbothered by their company.  
But the speaker goes on in the next stanza to question further whether these 
assumptions of fulfillment and definition are misconstrued, pondering her cat’s interiority 
and likening her to “poor Agnes.” Through the imagined subjectivity of the cat and her 
potential personhood—she might after all, think, dream, and imagine—she brings to the 
speaker’s attention Agnes, a black woman who works as a live-in maid for white people 
who, in their position of assumed powerful benevolence, believe her to be happy. Though 
they hold her in socioeconomic captivity, in service to their white desire, they assume she 
is “delighted” to inhabit that realm. The hyphenated connection the speaker draws 
between “house-maid” and “house-cat” not only links the two subjects by their house-
boundedness, it also emphasizes the domesticating work that the enclosures of home do 
in ostensibly offering comfortable lives to those within, despite how they occupy that 
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space. “Idle Wonder” reveals how subjugation operates through privilege, and it 
illustrates how the drawing of assumptions about others’ happiness (whether human or 
animal) who reside inside a home they did not choose belongs to people who believe they 
possess the power to confer favors through the superiority of their position.  
The poem goes even further than drawing attention to the privileged assumptions 
of those in domestic control in that it also draws a troubled connection between the 
isolation of the cat and that of Agnes. If the speaker views the cat as authentic and 
pleased in its isolation from other cats, it implies that Agnes’s employers attribute part of 
her delight to living away from black people and exclusively in a space of whiteness. But 
there is also evidence that Agnes has spoken of her thoughts, dreams, and imaginings of 
escaping those confines. This dissonance between her white employers’ false beliefs and 
the truth of Agnes’s desires are what compel the speaker to question her own 
assumptions.    
The speaker’s wondering about animal interiority and speculating about the falsity 
of her own conjectures, interestingly takes its route through the animal to the person, just 
as Coleman’s story “Three Dogs and a Rabbit” does. Through the cat, an appreciation for 
its interiority emerges in concert with lamentation for Agnes’s position, so that the poem 
suggests the workings of white superiority and white innocence may creep into human-
animal relationships unnoticed when assumptions about others’ experience glorify those 
who presume control. This brief study of Coleman’s writings suggest the potential for 
modernist studies to engage intersectionally with representations of animals and 
animality, and showcases opportunities for avoiding color-blind interpretations of animal 
representation. 
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Studies of Intersectional Animality 
What follows is a review of critical work around race, posthumanism, gender, and 
animal studies that argues ultimately for a need to engage with multiple frameworks 
when considering the nonhuman world. The work examined in the following pages does 
not necessarily focus on literary productions, but engages broadly with philosophy, 
cultural studies, and linguistics. A running thread through much of this work is an explicit 
rejection (or at least awareness) of the influential work of “the human” as a construct is 
posthumanist discourse. As many feminist scholars working along the intersectional lines 
of race, gender, and animality suggest, approaches to nonhuman recognition that find 
ways outside of the destructive and devaluing patterns established by the exceptionalism 
of “Man” are likely to be most productive when they engage feminist theorizations like 
that of Deckha, Jackson, and Lethabo King, which complicate how race and animality co-
constitute one another, and appreciate how racialized positionality might provide a 
stronger stance for coalition building outside the human hierarchies established by 
centuries of colonialism and racialization. 
Postcolonial theorists who were some of the first to examine how discourses and 
cultural imaginings around animals could not be isolated from histories of colonial 
racialization establish the need to see through colonialism’s species logic. Writing in 
PMLA in 2009, Neel Ahuja proposes that tracing nonhuman circulation (both figuratively 
and materially) inside “circuits of imperial biopower” holds the potential to shed greater 
light on colonial histories and machinations (556). He writes that a critique of 
animalization (the ways that racialized people are subjugated through animal 
comparisons) offers the most promise in terms of deconstructing “speciated reason’s 
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influence” (Ahuja 557). And Deckha was one of the first to argue that race needed to be 
central in feminist and postcolonial approaches to nonhuman animals. In a 2012 Hypatia 
article, she notes that previous work, which assessed connections between gender and 
species oppression, largely failed to include race and ethnicity as part of this restrictive 
matrix. And since “forces that code and privilege whiteness” work to reinforce the human 
and animal binary just as “species-related dimensions of oppression” work to reinforce 
the gender binary, she insists that attention must fall on race in the work needed to 
disable these oppressive mechanisms (Deckha 530). Proposing that colonial violence 
functions through “the differentiating logic of animalization, racialization, and 
dehumanization,” Deckha argues for reconceptualizations of humanist hierarchies using 
postcolonial feminism as a theoretical framework to aid posthumanism (539). Namely, 
she argues in a separate article, that discourse which relies on the nonhuman as a signifier 
of what the human is not necessarily includes notions of superiority, exclusion, and 
exceptionality in its ideological framework. And since not all humans fall into the 
category in which such discourse operates most forcefully—as in the legal domain for 
instance—this Western distinction is manipulated to oppress those “cast as subhuman or 
even nonhuman” (Decka 46).  
The discursive category of “the human” (deployed in innumerable contexts, but 
perhaps most forcefully in its assertion of the value of human lives) stratifies subjects 
through full, partial, and non-inclusion in its domain. Dehumanization, animalization, 
perceived associations with animals, or even a recognition of human animality render 
subjects vulnerable, then, to less protection since those lives are made to seem less 
valuable. Given the ways that racialized people and women have been historically 
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disempowered by animalizing narratives and figurations, one of the aims of current 
research is to revisit the “human” as the site where such trouble began. 
Some critics who in recent years have called for work in the humanities to engage 
with animals in nonreductive ways—and to move away from rejections of human 
animality as a strategy for maintaining human supremacy—conclude that Western 
humanism is assembled through hierarchies that rely on ideas of superiority, subjugation, 
and inferiority. Scholars such as Deckha, Jackson, Lethabo King, Weheliye, and Gossett 
argue that Enlightenment humanism classification systems (whether explicit or culturally 
implicit) maintain inequalities at levels beyond the species, and that this sort of 
orientation towards nonhumans necessarily affects constructed categories among human 
subjects as well. These scholars charge that gradations in political status as assigned to 
human and animal cannot be dissociated from racializing logics since race is, as 
Weheliye puts it, “a set of sociopolitical processes that discipline humanity into full 
humans, not-quite-humans, and nonhumans” (4). Thus, the “human” of posthumanism 
and of humanism is never just that: race, gender, class, age, ability status, and other 
differentiating features are all implicated in a hierarchical matrix that affirm or threaten 
one’s full inclusion inside the term according to the Eurocentric taxonomy from which it 
emerged. Writing in Polymorphous Domesticities, Juliana Schiesari also claims that 
humanism’s bedrock is “inherently ‘speciest’” since it declares the “primacy and 
superiority of humans over all other creatures” (5). She writes that by rejecting animals—
both without and within—humanity reveals its very inhumanity.  
Recognizing how Enlightenment humanism saturates posthumanist frameworks is 
crucial if race and animality are to be understood as constructs that can break free of the 
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subordinating hierarchies implied by this framework. Though anthropocentric by design, 
humanism may still hold space for an epistemic reconceptualization that decenters the 
human. The nonhuman turn that posthumanism heralds holds the potential to fully realize 
its aims if it can embrace a humanity that extends beyond—to use Sylvia Wynter’s 
lexicon—“Man.”7 Jackson, writing about animals, race, and posthumanism in Feminist 
Studies (2013), asks if there might be a “(post) humanism that does not privilege 
European Man,” one that no longer demands its “peculiar representation of humanity” 
perform as the fixed standard of what it means to be human (673). Observing that 
posthumanism maintains firm ties to rationalist hierarchies borne in Enlightenment 
thought, she calls for a “transformation within humanism” that contests the goal of 
racialized inclusion within the domain since, by its definition and inception, the “human” 
category is always already one that questions and resists full inclusion (Jackson 672). Uri 
McMillian, writing in a 2015 issue of GLQ devoted to “Queering the Nonhuman,” writes 
that the ongoing omission of critical race critique in posthumanism’s theorizing does 
violence as it continues to ignore the ways black subjects have historically been barred 
from full consideration under the sign “Man,” and have instead been relegated by 
Euroamerican social and political praxis to the “not-quite-human” category—particularly 
black women (224). As Tiffany Lethabo King also observes, “black and Indigenous 
people have never been fully folded into the category of the human” (167). Full inclusion, 
she writes, would in fact “disfigure [the human] beyond recognition” as it would no 
longer be able to maintain its rigid barriers of exclusion (King 165). And Alexander 
                                                 
7 Wynter describes “Man” as the “overrepresentation” of Western, white man as representative of all 
human beings (262). The capitalized claims that Man makes through Enlightenment epistemologies rely on 
racial constructions to justify black subordination. Wynter explains that Man’s certainty in an “objective set 
of facts” that could explain the universe became a means of rationalizing racial oppression (305).   
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Weheliye proposes that it is “visible human difference” that the construct of “Man” 
exploits and uses to bar “nonwhite subjects from the category of the human as it is 
performed in the modern west” (3-4). King, Jackson, and Weheliye all draw on the work 
of Sylvia Wynter whose extensive analyses over decades track the ways that racism and 
colonialism have worked to conceptualize the human. She finds that for black 
populations around the world, “systemic stigmatization, social inferiorization, and 
dynamically produced material deprivation [serve to] ‘verify’ the overrepresentation of 
Man as if it were the human” (Wynter 267).  
Scholars in Black and Indigenous Studies argue that “reconstruction and 
decolonization of what it means to be human” are part of the project of abolishing Man as 
a culturally dominating concept that structures ways of being human (Weheliye 4). 
Weheliye asserts that “cultural and political formations outside the world of Man” are 
necessary for replacing that mode with “alternative versions of humanity” (10). And 
Jackson also writes that “resisting the lure of liberal human recognition as a potential 
salve” is critical to avoid legitimating its implicit and explicit presumptions and its 
deployment of “bestializing social logics” that necessarily rely on devaluation as an 
epistemic inevitability (674). Further, those with an interest in queer exclusion from 
normative categorizing of the human see potential in “displacing the centrality of the 
human itself” by disavowing any “demand for recognition within the circle of humanity” 
(Luciano & Chen 184). And Eileen Joy, writing in GLQ, notes that “so many 
marginalized groups have always been ‘less than human’” that promise resides in the 
decision to take that designation as “an opportunity to finally bid the human adieu” and to 
create, in its place, new practices of freedom, being, and ethics (222-23).  
41 
Yet while calls for the rejection of Man, “the human,” and all of the ideological 
baggage that remains attached to the compulsive hierarchizing inherent in those 
categories has increased in recent years, some scholars remain cautious about fully 
aligning with ways of nonhuman being. Haritaworn, for instance asks whether and for 
whom “identifying with the nonhuman [might] be too risky a move?” (212). Given the 
pervasiveness of white America’s assignment of animalistic characteristics to people of 
color (and to women and those of lower socioeconomic status), appeals to reject the 
human in favor of a more definitionally ambiguous nonhumanity remain fraught. 
Embracing the nonhuman does, after all, entail treading in waters contaminated with 
histories of animalization and dehumanization. Megan Glick, writing on race, criminality 
and “reversals of the human,” argues that “histories of dehumanization have long mapped 
racial categories onto the animal-human boundary” so that lives seen as “disposable 
become the justification for death” (641). And Haritaworn observes the presence of a 
dual-faced paradox of dehumanization logics that renders African-Americans, for 
instance, as “both animalistic and cruel toward animals” (212). Such logic has meant that 
those deemed not fully human could be “continually rendered disposable” (Haritaworn 
213). In order to confront the human presumption that some lives are inherently more 
valuable than others, that some humans are more animal that others, that some humans 
are not animals, and that animalizing comparisons need be derogatory, posthumanism 
needs to integrate critical approaches that consider how racialization and animalization 
inform (or are absent from) the “post”- status that humanism pursues. Theorizing 
discourses of dehumanization and discursive correlations between race and animality 
emphasize just how extensively humanism’s foundations require chipping away. One 
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approach that Sharon Holland proposes is a purposeful avoidance of “defining the human 
against the animal other” such that they do not discursively exist in binary tension; she 
instead suggests aiming for “a potentiality for togetherness” that does not seek the lack in 
one to establish the greatness of the other (168).  
Animal Studies in Context 
So how does the animal figure in this critical context? Over the last decade, a 
critical focus on the animal as a subject (in itself, of language, and of ethical concern) 
indicates a striking increase in scholarly interest around nonhuman phenomenology, 
signification, and material, biopolitical, and environmental conditions. In Why Animal 
Studies Now? (2012), Kari Weil suggests that this sudden surge of attention results from 
an increased sense of our responsibility for the greatly imperiled biosphere and 
concurrent interest in the “posthuman sublime” (xx). She writes that animals, without a 
human language, provide a way of testing the limits of theories of ethics, power, and 
“otherness” (Weil 5). And she proposes that the predating of the ethical turn by both the 
linguistic turn and deconstruction spurred an interest in alterity while also exposing the 
narrow and precarious beliefs that undergird ideas of the human (Weil 17). Weil states 
that in contemporary thought, “the idea of ‘the animal’—the instinctive being with 
presumably no access to language, texts, or abstract thinking—has functioned as an 
unexamined foundation on which the idea of the human and hence the humanities have 
been built” (23).  
Predating this recent and sustained interest in nonhumans, critical study of the 
animal in humanistic fields first exploded fifteen years earlier with Derrida’s extended 
analysis that took seriously the animal question. Derrida’s work, which many in animal 
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studies consider foundational to legitimizing a serious theoretical engagement with 
nonhumans, first made waves in a 1997 lecture presented at a ten-day conference in 
Cerisy, France, and was later published in book form as The Animal That Therefore I Am. 
In examining some of the forms that the “unprecedented proportions” of animal 
subjugation takes, Derrida notes the difficulty of the task where subjugation becomes 
“violence in the most morally neutral sense of the term” yet where no one can “seriously 
deny the disavowal that this involves” (25). An uninterpretable history, a disavowal of 
unexplored depths of violence, and regularized subordination are all aspects of the 
human-animal relationship that Derrida begins to take up, and which he is often cited as 
first rigorously exploring. Central to that exploration is the fact that violence against 
animals is linguistically located; he finds the grouping together of all creatures under one 
signifying category—“the animal”—to be a sign of erasure, one that removes being from 
consideration (25). It is a category—not dissimilar from “the human” category—that 
erases its subject as it linguistically creates a new one, and yet this creation contains the 
power to materially affect beings themselves. Derrida’s lecture (along with his other 
works exploring “the question of the animal”) launched the field into what would become 
more mainstream academic inclusion, though scholars like Donna Haraway, Peter Singer, 
Tom Regan, Cary Wolfe, Lynn Margulis, and Mary Midgley had been making inroads in 
the 1980s and 90s as well. Though less singularly focused on nonhuman subordination 
and the surrounding ethical landscape, Deleuze and Guattari, and Giorgio Agamben are 
also noted thinkers who trace what it means to be a human animal.8 
                                                 
8 Agamben in particular takes up the “reversal of the hierarchical relationship between man and animal” 
which he names Heidegger as having called into question (57). 
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Critical animal studies, before it could be called a field in its own right, was from 
the first a politically oriented project with an investment in altering the course of 
nonhuman treatment by the human world. Ethical commitments are prominent in 
Haraway’s work from the start in Primate Visions (1989), which charts how efforts to 
understand nature are colonialist in their assertion that nature is somehow separate and 
apart from human life. Her work in When Species Meet (2008) and Staying with the 
Trouble (2012) continues to imagine ways of being among other species that are 
nonhierarchical and instead open to reconceptualization through our “response-ability” to 
“ongoing multispecies worlding on a wounded terra” (105). Meanwhile, Peter Singer’s 
utilitarian philosophical approach proposed in Practical Ethics (1979) introduces the 
notion of “equal consideration of interests to nonhumans” insisting that their suffering be 
given the same weight as ours (51).9 Critiques of Singer, however, claim that his 
philosophy assumes a universal ethical subject that is all-knowing and disembodied. 
Haraway, in fact, critiques this tendency among scientists and utilitarians in “Situated 
Knowledges” (1988) in which she argues for “insistent embodiment” as a way of 
“unmask[ing] the doctrines of objectivity” (578). Along this line, Mary Midgley in 
Animals and Why They Matter (1998) critiques Western philosophers like Rousseau, 
Hume, and Hobbes to find the rejection of emotion and the exaltation of reason as 
integral to the denigration of animals in Western culture, moves which prize a facility 
with language and rationality as indicators of lives worth greater significance. Midgley 
argues that the “barriers which our tradition has erected against concern for animals” 
must be dismantled for effective concern to take hold (144). Cary Wolfe, as one of the 
                                                 
9 Singer takes up questions of race as well through the experience of pain, pointing out that “white racists 
do not accept that pain is as bad when it is felt by blacks as when it is felt by whites” thus suggesting 
(though not directly) that racism operates along a continuum with speciesism (51). 
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best-known theorists in the field of critical animal studies, makes ethical commitments 
prominent as he also examines the “discourse of animality” as a tool of oppression 
against both humans and nonhumans. However, he makes a point in Zoontologies (2003) 
that the harms of such discourse “fall overwhelmingly on nonhuman animals” as we take 
for granted the ability to instrumentalize and exploit them (Wolfe xx). In his 2010 
examination of posthumanism, Wolfe goes on to suggest that humanism cannot (and will 
not) be dismissed or replaced, but that posthumanism can succeed in replacing 
dichotomies and dualisms, decentering the subject in fact, and adopting views that 
replace fragmentation with integration and an appreciation for complexity and 
dependence (254-55). 
More recent work in animal studies focuses on the need to supplant dualistic 
thinking and to take up questions of embodiedness, subject positionality, and by 
extension, identity. Stacy Alaimo, for one, challenges “elevated perspectives” finding 
them limiting for both feminism and critical environmentalism (7). She argues that the 
subject cannot be separate as a knower of the world because she is always a part of that 
world, embedded in webs of materiality. Jane Bennett’s work centralizes this idea as she 
inspects the vitality of all matter—living and not—such that she “highlight[s] the 
common materiality of all that is” (122). Yet within these critical texts that move away 
from Haraway’s “god trick” of assuming disembodiment, sidestepping the complexities 
of racialized embodiment remains suspiciously consistent. In Matthew Calarco’s 
Thinking Through Animals: Identity, Difference, Indistinction (2015) for instance, race 
does not come up as a construction to be interrogated. In a book about identity and 
difference, it is only mentioned once, and this for the purpose of analogizing how 
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speciesism works much like racism and sexism.10 This is to say that critical animal 
studies texts may articulate inquiries from positions that presume to be free of racist and 
sexist tendencies, yet by excluding human experiences of racism and sexism from 
consideration, they fail to recognize how such experiences shape views of identity and 
difference. When texts like Calarco’s mention race only once, and for the purposes of 
defining simply how prejudice operates, they implicitly suggest that human identity is 
universal, while also insinuating that white, Western relationships to animals constitute 
the totality of human-animal relations.  
Race as a Starting Point 
Meanwhile those concerned that animal studies scholars have failed to account for 
the role race plays in conceptions of the animal, and others concerned that animal studies 
scholars direct their ethical concerns toward nonhumans when human inequality and 
suffering remain widespread often invoke postcolonial theorists like Franz Fanon, Aimé 
Césaire, and Achille Mbembe to situate colonialism and animalization in close proximity. 
The frameworks provided by these postcolonial theorists observe racialization and 
animalization to be entanglements exploited by conquest and capitalism. Achille 
Mbembe in “Necropolitics” (2013) explicates how colonialism and its reliance on racism 
and animal degradation are ways that power functions outside of the law, in ways that 
achieve capitalist end points. Racism in Mbembe’s formulation denies all kinship 
between colonizer and colonized, and what’s more transforms others through “the eyes of 
the conqueror” into “savage life” which is to say, “another form of animal life” that is 
determined less by skin color than by fears (abounding in the colonialist) that “savages 
                                                 
10 Calarco writes: “Just as racists and sexists fail to treat likes alike in terms of race and sexual difference, 
so, identity theorists argue, speciesists fail to give equal consideration to … other species” (24).  
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are…‘natural’ human beings who lack the specifically human character” (24). Such 
equations have enabled ideologies of death (or necropolitics) that continue to incite 
violence and killings of people and animals categorized outside of the colonialist’s 
“human” realm. Further work, like Césaire’s Discourse on Colonialism (1972) names 
colonization as a process of “thingification” in which both domination and submission 
animalize all involved (44). Césaire articulates the need to redefine—conceptually and 
linguistically—the human outside of and against colonial Eurocentric paradigms. Frantz 
Fanon two decades earlier set forward a radical task in Black Skin, White Masks (1952): 
“to get man to admit he is nothing, absolutely nothing—and get him to eradicate this 
narcissism whereby he thinks he is different from other ‘animals’” as a way of becoming 
more human (6). Fanon explains his first-hand experience of racialization as one of 
animalization, in which his “body was returned” to him “disjointed, redone, draped in 
mourning” where he received the colonialist message that “the Negro is an animal the 
Negro is bad” (93). Fanon’s work, however, does not collude with colonialism’s 
disparagement of the animal, but instead challenges its conception of the human as 
superior, as non-animal. Though Weheliye notes that Fanon was not a feminist by 
contemporary standards, his efforts to reframe what it means to be human have been 
taken up by scholars like Sylvia Wynter and Hortense Spillers who have expanded his 
rejection of the colonial human to one that calls for the abandonment of Man (22).  
In particular, Wynter’s critiques of “the human” as a construction, and her efforts 
at reconceptualizing different “genres of the human” are taken up frequently by scholars 
interested in situating human-animal relationships outside of Enlightenment hegemonic 
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paradigms.11 Because Wynter centers race and gender as productive breaking-off points 
from Man, she challenges Western colonial epistemes that put racializing logics into 
material practice. Jackson writes that Wynter’s work could dramatically alter the course 
of posthumanism were it to be widely taken up. Speculating about posthumanism’s 
future, Jackson asks whether the binaries that posthumanism queries (e.g. human/animal, 
nature/culture) might finally “find their relief outside of the epistemological locus of the 
West” through frameworks like Wynter’s that see the human divorced from Man (673). 
Lethabo King also engages Wynter’s views that categories of exclusion emerge from 
systems of knowledge that construct categories as a means of deciphering the world; such 
systems seek to create order against chaos, thus creating the ur-binary that stirs beneath 
them all (177). Wynter’s work represents a thirty-year engagement with the question of 
what it means to be human through an “unsettling” of colonizing epistemes, and her most 
recent volume (a project in conjunction with Katherine McKittrick) looks at the current 
moment of crisis as one that might only be affected through rethinking the human. A 
dialogue between Wynter and McKittrick entitled “Unparalleled Catastrophe for our 
Species? Or to Give Humanness a Different Future” explores how humans create 
narratives to explain the universe and our place in it, and through these processes they 
determine humanness as a practice. Because humans are both “bios and mythoi,” Wynter 
concludes that to be a human is to be “no longer a noun”; instead, “being human is a 
praxis” (23). And through such practices, new worldbuilding can commence, which is 
urgently necessary in this critical moment. Wynter urges that the anthropocentric 
challenges that have come about through narrative practices must be confronted with 
narratives that redefine the very characters involved.  
                                                 
11 Jackson, Weheliye, Lethabo King, Gossett all engage her frameworks. 
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New approaches apprehending representations of animals alongside or through 
what Claire Jean Kim terms “the optic” of race include her book Dangerous Crossings: 
Race, Species and Nature in a Multicultural Age (2015). In it, Kim examines not only 
how power operates within a matrix in which histories of racialization rely on animality 
as a vector of control, but she also considers the ways that “animal kinds” and 
taxonomies of racial difference specifically matter (Kim 17). Kim observes that the two 
concepts are inseparable since “animalization has been central not incidental to the 
project of racialization” (18). Importantly, she notes that violence against racialized 
people is (and has historically been made) permissible through comparisons to animals, 
since animals are already denied rights and legal protections believed inherent to humans 
(24). And in Western civilization, the killing of animals has long been thought to 
demonstrate the possession of control and a way of bringing about order through 
domination (Kim 32). Kim sees racism and animality as always intertwined, but 
depending on one’s identity, the terms of dehumanization change and function 
differently; for instance, Native Americans were viewed by white colonists as “barely 
distinguishable” from the animals who roamed the North American landscape, while 
black people were accorded low status on the Great Chain of Being, and most closely 
linked to apes (25, 43). These differences meant that violence functioned differently 
though no less consistently. Indians, like other animals on the American continent, were 
approached through a strategy of removal and eradication by European-Americans 
aiming to clear the terrain. Blacks experienced scientific racism that characterized them 
as bestial and threatening, and thus subject to confinement, enslavement and punishment 
(Kim 41). These histories matter as they still operate within the American cultural 
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imaginary and structure how race and animality continue to undergird violence and 
injustice. Ideologies of domination, of either/or’s, binaries, and inclusions/exclusions 
continue to define what it means to be human, Kim finds, and finally calls not for an 
“extensionist” approach to humans and some primates, but rather a “reconstructive one” 
that reimagines all species “outside of systems of domination” (287). This important 
work provides direction in terms of identifying how racial tropes perform distinctively, 
and in spotting a way forward through a repudiation of dominion. 
Embracing alterity and rejecting hierarchical perspectives, other recent 
scholarship also attempts to move toward disrupting ideologies of exceptionalism. Works 
by Paul Outka, Mel Y. Chen, Christopher Pexa, and Vera Coleman all find the reframing 
of human-animal relations to depend on a rejection of hierarchical thinking and praxis, 
which also form the bedrock of racializing constructions. These linguistic and literary 
analyses work through the normative dehumanizing violence that whiteness and the 
human do in efforts to subjugate all those outside the inner circle. Whether through 
Coleman’s “differentiated bodies,” Chen’s “queer animacies,” or Pexa’s animal kinships, 
alternative means of approaching living beings relies on unmasking the assumptions 
inherent in Western outlooks and language (Coleman 695; Chen 70). Crucially, Chen’s 
Animacies (2012) dissects how signifiers and conditions of discourse that dictate “brutal 
hierarchies of sentience” assign agency to some beings and make objects of others (43). 
In their refusal to declare that distinct boundaries cordon off human, animal, and object, 
they engage in making horizontal what was previously vertically hierarchical, taking into 
account, race, sexuality, disability, and species status (19). As Chen concludes, changing 
what it means to be alive and to matter are possible both through and outside of 
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language—by uncoding signification’s hidden determinants and finding spaces that 
mainstream narratives do not (or cannot) articulate. Vera Coleman, writing in ISLE, 
examines Latin literature of the Southern Cone, and finds that texts that read humans 
transformed into amphibians, fish, or other animals depict these hybrid creatures as 
“exuberant rather than monstrous” (695). Suggesting that encounters with evolution in 
which humans perceive continuity with other lifeforms, and appreciate the brilliance of 
alterity, are critical if we are to survive the Anthropocene and the challenges we present 
within it. A “multispecies frame” that comprehends human animality as our connection to 
the world can also appreciate the ways other species are radically different from ours and 
also entirely outside of the rankings of inferiority in which Western thinking has boxed 
them (695). Finally, Pexa’s article in PMLA reads traditional Dakota literature for its 
approach to animals that sets them within tiospaye, or a kinship circle that also includes 
the land. Through this, he locates resistance to the state’s coercive efforts to define 
citizenship and personhood. Again, a history of collective lineage that includes all beings 
and predates history counters governmental attempts to define the human as a capitalist 
individualistic subject. According to Dakota ethical codes, animals are due rights and 
obligations within a political system that recognizes their personhood. By respecting “the 
power inherent in alterity,” he suggests that Dakota traditions illustrate a decolonized 
model for relinquishing the instrumentalizing power that the nation state holds to be 
inalienable.  
Finally, Paul Outka in his examination of trauma and its relationship to the 
sublime brings forward the tension between race in America and white 
environmentalism’s focus on conservation and the preservation of species over concerns 
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of racial injustice. In Race and Nature: From Transcendentalism to the Harlem 
Renaissance (2008), Outka asserts that race (and its emergence through violence) cannot 
be separated from nature as both are constructs that originate in the dissolution of 
subjectivity. Finding nature and race to be “perhaps the two most perniciously reified 
constructions in American culture,” he points to the failure of ecocriticism to thoroughly 
unpack the connections between the two, while also noting that the field is in many ways 
immersed in whiteness with little concern for how environmental destruction correlates 
with racial injustice (Outka 3). However, he makes a point of repeating a criticism that 
James Cone voices: that white people are more concerned with the spotted owl or 
endangered whales than with the “survival of young blacks” in urban centers (Outka 1, 
3). This critique repeats, rather troublingly, that such comparisons are apt, that concern 
for one group competitively outweighs concern for another, and that African Americans 
in cities are uniformly in need of white care. Outka’s drawing out of connections between 
racial and nature/wilderness constructions are brilliantly observed in articulating how 
whiteness regulates “two landscapes and two races” where one is exploitable and 
expendable, and the other pristine, sublime, and powerful (9). Yet his criticism, while it 
makes a point of disavowing the implication that blackness be read as a substitute for 
race since many racial constructions persist in the US, his work does not draw out such 
distinctions within the construction of nature. It tends to then conflate nature, wilderness, 
the environment, and non-domesticated animals as all synonymous with nature, which 
further reifies this construction.  
This particular tendency is of course not limited to Outka, but exists in 
environmental discourse more generally. In terms of animal life, this has the effect of not 
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only further homogenizing nonhuman life, but further reducing its vivacity; animals 
become not even animals—they become subsumed by nature or the environment. The 
codifying forces of language already create categories of indistinction, and the 
hierarchical ordering that Western ideologies and systems of knowledge depend on 
further solidify the placement of those categories, and while ecologically all matter is 
connected, this linguistic interchange between nature, the environment, and animals 
further limits the potential for theoretical intervention and for progressive action. It 
makes abstract what is vital and tangible, and sanctions disconnections from sentient 
creatures by labelling them components of a construction. Critical approaches to race and 
animal studies (and racialization and its ties to animalization) can most productively and 
ethically work towards liberatory ends by disrupting those disarticulations and working 
through the conflicts they continually reinscribe. 
Animal representation, ultimately, cannot be divorced from considerations of race 
in America. The work of postcolonial theorists, scholars who chart the entanglements of 
power and domination that structure race and animality, critics reading these intersections 
in fields of contemporary literature, and those who have begun this work in modernism 
demonstrate that refiguring the animal also means reforming the human. In modernist 
studies and critical approaches to early-twentieth-century literature, the animal opens up 
in fascinating proximity to this same human, nudging it towards an acknowledgment of 
its animalistic roots. Importantly, however, when reading outside of the white modernist 
canon, the animal emerges as not atavistic or primitive, but redemptive in its dignity and 
fullness. In opposition to modernist texts that render the animal (and the human animal) 
as monstrously other, prose and poetry that demonstrates how racialization and 
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animalization fundamentally distort subjects offer a means of reclaiming them from white 
epistemologies of subordination. When race and animality are read alongside one 
another, a challenge to the notion of the human appears that embraces a human animal 
that is not so distinctly above or different. When reading such intersections in 





OUTSIDE VOICES: NARRATIVE ALTERITY IN DEPICTIONS OF THE 
NONVERBAL AND THE NONHUMAN IN  
THEIR EYES WERE WATCHING GOD 
As Michael Awkward observes in his Introduction to New Essays on Their Eyes 
Were Watching God, many (if not most) of Zora Neale Hurston’s contemporaries in the 
1930s African-American literary world received her second novel with a lack of fanfare, 
reviewing it with either indifference or outright scorn (7). Read by Richard Wright, for 
instance, as a novel whose “sensory sweep…carries no theme, no message, no thought” it 
was generally perceived to be a book that pandered to a white audience who wished to 
read African-American folk culture with “a piteous smile” (25). But with Awkward and a 
host of scholars beginning with Robert Hemenway in 1977 whose critical engagement 
with the novel quickly led to its canonization as both an African-American and a 
modernist classic, the complexities of the text’s form, thematic concerns, and its political 
potential quickly emerged. Prominent among these themes of interest, and formerly 
unnoticed by Hurston’s male literary cohort, was (as Awkward points out) “the theme of 
patriarchal power” (12). Much feminist scholarship has since attended to the complex and 
contradictory means by which the novel both resists and accepts gendered power 
dynamics and institutions, and many have lauded or questioned Janie’s eventual 
liberation as an independent black woman.1 Few however, have read the novel as one that 
radically interrogates—or allows readers to—the relationship between figurations of the 
                                                 
1 In addition to Awkward’s work which sees “verbal power” as correlative with Janie becoming a “fully 
active agent,” Mary Helen Washington argues that Janie is perpetually silenced, Carla Kaplan reads voice 
as an ambivalent force in the text, and Cheryl Clarke reads Janie as achieving particularly feminist form of 
power by reaching beyond voice and into the visual (600).   
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gendered human and the frequent appearance of (and comparison to) animals in pivotal 
scenes. More specifically, Their Eyes prompts questions about how and what it means for 
the text to signify connections between gendered blackness, animality, and the (so-called) 
animal. 
 In thematizing patriarchal power, Sharon Davie claims that Their Eyes Were 
Watching God challenges a hierarchical ordering of the world in which men are on top, 
just as it also sometimes explicitly contests a human-centric hierarchical world order. 
Through the portrayal of various animals’ subjectivities—a mule, vultures, a cow, a rabid 
dog—Hurston upends what Sharon Davie observes to be “the illusion of hierarchy and 
control” in which humans are the only subjects (448). And as the novel also draws 
parallels in its insistence that the black “woman is de mule uh de world” and crosses 
ontological boundaries through Tea Cake’s infection with rabies, it draws attention to the 
close relationship between racialized narratives of animality and humanist ideology that 
hierarchizes human beings at the pinnacle (14). Further, it draws gendered distinctions 
between figurations of racialized animality, just as it also opens on to a consciousness 
about animals that curiously explores their being. The novel’s thematic openness to the 
animal within a historical and narrative context in which dehumanization is both 
racialized and normalized suggests a turn away from patriarchal white humanism, and 
towards life outside that order. Or, as Dana Luciano and Mel Y. Chen posit, these 
interlocking themes may arise though “an awareness of dehumanization” that does not 
turn away from questions “of objectification or dehumanization,” but instead turns 
toward the nonhuman as a way of eluding subjection to the idea of “the human” (186). 
Hurston knits themes of power and freedom inside the story of a black woman who is 
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treated as a mule, and who later kills her husband when he is overtaken by a “mad dog,” 
and thereby calls attention to the ways that logics of domination are insidiously 
interwoven into the story (187). But in attending to the animal as subject, the novel chips 
away at the very foundations of this logic, destabilizing the supremacy of “the human,” 
and insisting on the importance of looking outside of that coercive form.   
Part of this looking outside involves the very form of the novel itself, where 
dynamic and unexpected jumps between voices and perspectives resist a settled 
commitment to a singular narrative voice, and thus refuse fidelity to the notion of a 
singular, narrative authority. Through its innovative form, Their Eyes explores both the 
animal and racialized figures of animality with a dynamic narrative that does more than 
alternate between free indirect discourse and character dialogues. It also gives voice to 
animals (the vultures) through dialogue, depicts silences as vivid and active, speculates 
about nonhuman subjectivity, portrays humanized animals, and illustrates how 
dehumanization narratives work to wrest control from their speakers. At certain points, 
what may at first read as Janie’s voice assuming agency can be examined more critically 
to expose racialized narratives in fact taking control. In particular, the novel’s trial scene, 
where Janie characterizes Tea Cake as possessed by “that mad dog that was in him,” 
relies on a racialized narrative that bestializes black men—though Janie claims her 
greatest testimonial concern is remaining true to herself and fending off “lying thoughts” 
with a fear worse than death (187). Janie’s voice, its connection to her intentions and her 
sense of self, becomes—in these final scenes—not a demonstration of self-possession, 
but instead a questionable expression of agency suggesting rather a co-option of voice by 
a racist narrative of black beastiality.  
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Yet reading Janie Crawford as a figure who comes to self-awareness through bold 
possession of not only her own voice, but of the narrative in which she resides as well, 
has served as the foundational premise for many interpretive treatments of Their Eyes 
over the past three decades. Since Henry Louis Gates in The Signifying Monkey identified 
Janie as “the protagonist [who] approaches self-consciousness” through a text that 
increasingly employs “free indirect discourse to represent her development,” her 
autonomous growth has been read as inextricably woven into the narrative fabric of the 
novel (203). Gates claims that the novel’s form allows for Janie’s emergent possession of 
her own voice to reveal itself as the novel progresses—not only does her spoken voice 
become more prominent, but her presence in the third-person narrative through free 
indirect discourse does as well (215). And Janie finds autonomous fulfillment by the 
novel’s end through her assertion of voice, which also permits her conscious awareness 
of her own interior/exterior division. While some critics question Gates’s assertion that 
Janie indeed gains an autonomous voice—arguing instead that she is either silenced by 
the narrative as Carla Kaplan finds, or does not actually achieve verbal agency as Robert 
Stepto writes—scant attention focuses on the ways the narrative challenges an 
unequivocal belief in the supremacy of voice as a means to (or indication of) self-
actualization (Washington 99, Stepto 166).2 Yet the novel itself concludes with this very 
challenge when Janie resumes her frame narrative and tells Phoeby that “talkin’ don’t 
amount tuh uh hill uh beans when yuh can’t do nothin’ else” (192). These—nearly the 
last words she speaks before “a finished silence” takes hold of the final three 
paragraphs—dismisses the value of talk (192). In a novel that engages with a variety of 
                                                 
2 Michael Awkward, Carla Kaplan, and Mary Helen Washington all question the extent of Janie’s self-
realization and acquisition of unencumbered vocal freedom. 
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animals in different contexts, it is significant that silence concludes the narrative because 
language is one of the fundamental distinctions said to divide humans from the rest of the 
living universe. With its various digressions into silence and depictions of that which 
emerges when voice is not at the foreground, the novel registers an alignment with 
nonverbal spaces outside of the vocal narrative, including that of nonhuman being. A 
consciousness of alterity subtly fractures the suggestion that all can be told through 
vocalized discourse. In Their Eyes, the workings of race, gender, humanness, animalness, 
and narrative form all cooperate to trouble the ground of authority and control on which 
humanism rests, opening finally on to a silence that overshadows voice as a sign of 
authority.  
Voice, Alternative Linguistics, and Long Silences 
Critical readings that valorize Janie’s vocal emancipation crucially recognize the 
importance of a black woman vocalizing her experience, directing the narrative, escaping 
her abusive marriages, and coming to peace with herself (Awkward 18, Gates 197, Clarke 
599). Yet the idea that Janie exploits white discourses of black dehumanization to gain 
legal exoneration calls into question what many scholars have celebrated as Janie’s 
ultimate coming to self-awareness and autonomy. Cautiously approaching claims that 
Janie finally speaks for herself, and recognizing instead that her legal testimony trades in 
ideas of white human exceptionalism, we are better able to read what goes unsaid in the 
novel. The novel does present its own self-critical moral paradigm in the trial scene, for 
instance, when the black community reacts to Tea Cake’s death with objections that are 
forced to be silently embodied. But there are other moments as well when the novel 
explores the nonlinguistic and thus poses a challenge to the idea of narrative control as 
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triumph. By directing attention away from what goes spoken, and toward what goes 
unspoken—by the black community, by Janie, by Tea Cake, and by nonhuman actors—
we can read agency in silence as much as it dwells in voice. In the novel’s trial scene, the 
black community is prohibited from speaking, but nonetheless silently protests Tea 
Cake’s death with movement, glares, and unsettled presence—what Rachel Blau 
DuPlessis calls “undepicted speech” (107). The novel portrays silent voices of resistance 
to the projection of animality onto black characters, as it also explores modes of 
awareness and power that are not made evident through voice, but rather through silence, 
movement, listening, and other nonverbal acts. It thus formally and thematically 
challenges a humanist privileging of voice, and at certain points, engages a sustained 
curiosity about the nonvocal and the nonhuman. 
A challenge to the primacy of voice in this canonical African-American text—one 
that innovated the use of dialect inside a third-person narration and opened up rhetorical 
possibilities for black representation—means not to assert that Janie’s vocal emancipation 
does not occur, but seeks to locate how the novel implies voice is only a partial form of 
representation. The novel indeed works towards Janie’s security within her own voice, 
but it also questions this end and pays particular attention to voice’s absence. Self-
awareness correlates to a degree with Janie’s assumption of voice and control of the 
narrative by her own perspective, but the text itself does not engage in a full celebration 
of its vocally triumphant protagonist; instead it champions modes of silence and 
nonverbal communication, and opens on to multiple explorations of subjectivity and 
expression. It insistently suggests that something else is heard—and can be said—when 
vocalized language retreats.  
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Even as the form and content of Their Eyes have opened critical discussions 
around the literary use of folklore, dialect, aesthetics, narrative politics, and around the 
novel’s feminist, anti-racist (or racist), and sociopolitical emancipatory potential, little 
attention has yet been paid to its prescient ecocritical and posthumanist force. The keen 
sensitivity the text communicates for nonhuman existence and the ways in which the 
narrative voice breaks or alters around depictions of both animals and animality works to 
unfold an interpretation of experience that investigates being beyond language. Taking up 
the novel’s depictions of animals and approaching its formal qualities from a modernist 
perspective, Their Eyes reads as open to alterity through language that cannot fully 
contain. Contemporaneous with literature that explores language as non-mimetic, as a 
medium that can obscure as much as it clarifies, the novel punctures language by looking 
around it, by interrupting speech, by attending to characters who do not speak (or do so 
only in snippets), and in giving voice to those who do not actually speak. These formal 
dislocations demonstrate that textual representations of languagelessness cannot be 
adequately captured, but still the text gestures toward reading beyond language. In this 
way, it can be read as not only modernist, but in some scenes as fantastically 
posthumanist as well. The novel resists an acceptance of the animal as flat, soulless or 
disposable, and finds exceptional ways of depicting the animal both on its own terms and 
through different human lenses that both illuminate and obscure how human perspectives, 
language, and silence shape it as a figure and determine its material being as well.  
Posthuman Potential 
Exploring the nonhuman and nonverbal allows a means of seeing outside the 
sphere of “the human” perspective. Growing concern in literary and cultural studies with 
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the animal, the nonhuman, and the posthuman over the last decade increasingly looks to 
narratives and literary practices that subvert a traditional humanist perspective that 
centers the human as omniscient knower. This concentration on literary representations 
that decentralize the human in some way points to an interest in nonhuman others at this 
ecological crisis point in time, but also often dares to challenge an Enlightenment 
ideology that places the human in a position of superiority. While theoretical explorations 
of “the human” from critical race, feminist, and disability perspectives have been (and 
continue to be) vital in articulating how this category champions some and stigmatizes 
others, recent work in posthumanism and animal studies adds another layer to 
considerations of how this designation functions. Most fundamentally, such work 
considers the subjugation of other forms of life under the human; it suggests that this 
temporal moment—the Anthropocene—in which “we” regard “the human” as superior to 
other forms of life requires that we release the structuring notion of the human if we wish 
to escape the dire fate it has assigned itself (and its animal others). The idea of the human 
as separate and above is one that gained scientific acceptance in the eighteenth century as 
the physical and biological sciences came to regard the concept of the human as a “single 
species subject to a natural law,” observes Elizabeth Povinelli in Geontologies (8). That 
is to say, Western eighteenth-century science conceptually naturalized the human as “the 
Human.” And as Silvia Wynter discusses, this naturalized category functioned to 
legitimate “genres of being human” that would then “invent, label, and institutionalize” 
black people as the “subrational Human Other” (281-282). Moving beyond the traditional 
and exclusive Western humanist interest in the human (where ‘the human’ also typically 
connotes the white, male as ideal), Their Eyes disavows these limited perspectives and 
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alters the conceptual borders around what it means to be human and complicates the 
possibilities for what it means to apprehend the animal. The novel also rehearses the 
categorical failures of the term “human” to bring about a humane form of justice for a 
terminally ill black man, and demonstrates how discourses of dehumanization and 
animality function in justifying his death. 
Histories of racial- and gender-based subjugation both figure into conceptions of 
animals in the novel, even as the text represents the animal as a being with its own history 
of subjugation. While work in posthumanism attends to the ‘question of the animal,’ only 
some work examines how such questions are always imbedded with racialized and 
gendered notions. Mel Y. Chen notes that constructed linguistic links exist between 
animals and people of color such that they are discursively referenced as those “against 
which the (often rational) human with inviolate and full subjectivity is defined” (95). 
Chen claims that animals as figures mediate spaces “when many axes of human 
difference collide” (100). Their Eyes attends to these figurations of animals as mediators 
of difference, and the text approaches figures of animality from multiple angles, allowing 
such figures as the mule to serve white humanistic ends of dominance and superiority, 
while also fundamentally upending those logics. The novel engages discourses 
surrounding the animal that intersect with racialized histories of subjugation and then 
refutes the traditional humanist power of these intersections. Even more, the novel 
presents even more opportunities for reading animals as inherently complex beings. 
Taken together, posthumanism and black studies supply frameworks for 
apprehending the figure of the animal as more than a metaphor for human struggle. 
Previously, however, animal figures in Their Eyes have been viewed through an analytic 
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lens that viewed them symbolically. For instance, some scholars read representations of 
animals in the novel as figurative critiques of white American discourse and structures of 
power. Davie, as mentioned, looks to the freeing of Matt Bonner’s mule and its funeral as 
a “deliberate undermining of hierarchy” (448). And Brian Roberts explores how the 
novel instrumentalizes discourses around human-animal interactions to critique larger 
“dominant discourses” (42). He suggests that Hurston satirizes dominant white American 
discourse that characterized African-American men as predatory, and instead places 
white men in the role of “hyper-predator” (Roberts 42). However, more recent work in 
animal studies endeavors to read literary representations of animals as more than veiled 
critiques or metaphoric upendings. Bénédicte Boisseron’s Afro-Dog: Blackness and the 
Animal Question (2018), for example, studies the relationship between blackness and 
animality, and the connections between the dog itself and African American lives. 
Boisseron’s book proposes that “interspecies connectedness” can be read through the 
history of the black Atlantic and that of the animal, so that connection beyond that of a 
“comparable state of subjection and humiliation” is the focus (xx). Such works propose 
an opportunity for viewing Hurston’s animals as representations of the complexity 
present in the nonhuman, and as more than symbols of human-to-human struggle.  
The Mule as Vital, Unspeaking Subject 
Matt Bonner’s mule—his figuration as animal itself, as metaphoric representation 
of black women’s experience, and as figurative symbol for African-American 
enslavement—illustrates how the animal figure can be read in multiply complex and 
intersecting ways. Additionally, the mule provides an opportunity for examining 
representations of nonvocalized subjectivity as a way of exploring what the animal itself 
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might actually be. Since the mule does not himself speak, he emerges as a subject 
through his own actions and through a narrator that speculates on the mule’s lived 
experience. Such experiences include seeking out his own home in Central Florida, 
plowing fields for Matt Bonner on little food, enduring abuse and baiting by men at the 
Eatonville General Store, securing freedom after Joe “buys” him, becoming a member of 
the community, and finally one day succumbing. The narration explains how—
nonvocally—the mule struggled through to the end:  
He died. Lum found him under the big tree on his rawbony back with all four feet 
up in the air. That wasn’t natural and it didn’t look right, but Sam said it would 
have been more unnatural for him to have laid down on his side and died like any 
other beast. He had seen Death coming and had stood his ground and fought it 
like a natural man. He had fought it to the last breath. Naturally he didn’t have 
time to straighten himself out. Death had to take him like it found him. (59) 
Both animal and lifeless, the mule in his dead silence occupies a physical space that the 
narrative attempts to capture and represent. The image of the mule’s body as rigid, 
resistant, and defensive draws parallels between humans and animals (explicitly likening 
the mule to “a natural man”), and also reads meaning into embodiment. Last standing 
stiff and self-protective against the nonspeaking approach of “Death,” the mule (as the 
narrative interprets) resists it in a nonverbal struggle that signals itself through a physical 
becoming, where life fights with taut muscles and unyielding postures, and death prevails 
through a final solidification of the body. And yet, though the mule, life, and death are all 
silent—or nonlinguistic—the physicality of this imagery suggests the vibrancy of all 
three, and beyond that, the ways that language can only begin to approach experience 
which the body apprehends differently. As Sharon Davie suggests, Hurston returns focus 
throughout the novel to both “bodily experiences” and to “physical action and its results,” 
and through these foci she emphasizes “the multiple, sliding relation between language 
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and experience” (455). This is to say, the novel does not rest securely in the notion that 
language can know or capture experience, and through its focus on the physicality of 
bodies—especially those who do not speak—it explores consciousness and existence that 
evades the surety of vocal declaration. 
 While the scene interprets the mule’s lively interaction with death, it also 
interrupts assumptions about what it means to be animal. It sunders a connection between 
the constructs of animal and nature, rupturing a sense of continuity between the two, and 
thereby pulling the animal out of its ostensibly embedded place in the natural order. The 
mule in death does not appear “natural” and would have appeared even less so had it 
fallen on its side “like any other beast” (59). The mule stands out from the established 
codes of beastly animality, and demonstrates intention, vigor, and spirit, according to its 
human lingual interpreters. Lum and Sam nimbly ascribe personhood to this “natural 
man” of a mule who transcends the categorical limitations implied by the animal label. 
Remarkably, Matt Bonner’s mule is a character who is anthropomorphized—with 
some levity— in terms of his intentions, reactions, expressions, and resentments, but 
remains all the while firmly and nonhumanly mule. He does not fantastically exceed his 
animal qualities, but through narrative attention, he emerges as a character that is not just 
a “poor brute beast” either (56). He assumes a subjectivity imbued with desires and 
revulsions. He is a mule who “did everything but let himself be bridled and visit Matt 
Bonner” (59). Hurston illuminates his complex subjectivity through language that attends 
to the mule’s physical being as an expression of his seemingly willful interiority. But this 
language hints at its own speculative qualities: never speaking himself, but acting in ways 
that appear conscious and deliberate, the mule’s actions are chronicled and interpreted 
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after they are completed. The narrative can only speculate on the mule’s intentions, 
which are nonlinguistic and independent of the rational ordering and authority of speech.  
Prior to his death, “the case of Matt Bonner’s yellow mule” occupies substantial 
textual and imaginative space a third of the way through the novel, which follows his 
emancipation by Joe Sparks (who the townspeople then liken to Abraham Lincoln), and 
through to his funeral and eventual consumption by a committee of vultures (51). The 
mule’s story illustrates how he functions as both metaphor and as agential creature. The 
mule even has a back story that explains how he first arrived in Eatonville through his 
own intention. According to Lum, the “mule had sense” that he wasn’t satisfied living in 
West Florida, so rode Matt Bonner into the state’s interior, where he goes on to waste 
away on the little he’s fed (56). He becomes so thin, the men Sam, Lige, and Walter, who 
“hear and see more about that mule than the whole county put together,” joke that women 
are using the mule’s ribs as a washboard and hanging clothes to dry on his bony hips 
(51). The subject of much general conversation at the store, the mule supplies the men 
with opportunities to poke fun at Matt Bonner, and finally becomes an object who is 
physically poked for fun by the men. The jovial torment begins when the mule announces 
himself before his arrival at Joe’s store with a “braying…at the edge of the woods” (56). 
This call signals his approach and also emphasizes his alternative speech and its 
unsuspecting sense of how this speech threatens his wellbeing since Lige and Lum then 
prepare to catch him for sport.   
This scene sets off the sequence of events that leads to the mule’s eventual 
purchase and release by Joe Sparks, who overhears Janie’s critiques she mutters to herself 
over the men’s mule-baiting; Joe takes it upon himself to free the mule from further 
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abuse. It begins when the men tackle the mule, surround him, and poke him to the point 
of whirling exhaustion. The animal’s bodily reactions are described as “panting and 
heaving from the effort of spinning,” he is made to “show his temper,” and finally has 
“more spirit left than body” (56). These visceral descriptions are then aligned 
immediately with Janie’s reaction to the scene when “she snatched her head away…and 
began muttering to herself” (56). Unable to watch the mule’s torment, Janie’s body reacts 
as a mirror for his spinning attempts to escape. She likewise turns away and heads inside 
to rail against the abuse privately. But Joe, tormenter himself of Janie, overhears her 
lamenting to herself the mule’s treatment, protesting against its having “been worked tuh 
death” and having had “his disposition ruint wid mistreatment, and now they got tuh 
finish devilin’ ‘im tuh death” (56). Janie’s sympathy for the mule recognizes how abuse 
damaged his temperament and yet persists despite the fact that he’s worked to the bone. 
This lamentation aligns with Janie’s grandmother’s observation earlier in the novel that 
black women are the mules of the world, as Janie herself endures not dissimilar treatment 
from her husband whose store she tends daily with few opportunities to go outside. He 
strikes her as well, slapping her face when the meal she planned and prepared all day did 
not turn out well (72). Janie’s connection with the mule’s suffering, in this instance, is a 
call for justice and release, even though the connection does arise through what Boisseron 
calls a “comparable state of subjection and humiliation” (xx). DuPlessis argues that “the 
figure of the mule…is the symbol of all the silencing Joe imposes on Janie throughout 
their marriage” and from this springs Janie’s empathy (107). The mule’s silence, or 
nonlinguistic utterances, connect with Janie’s having been silenced, so that she can see 
the mule’s nonverbal suffering and history even though he cannot speak it. Years of hard 
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labor and malnutrition make that clear. And the mule’s spirited protests against the men 
who goad it speak to Janie’s vivacious and livid reactions to his treatment. Joe overhears 
her private protests and in a moment of uncharacteristic compassion negotiates 
determinedly with Matt Bonner to buy the mule for five dollars. Joe becomes a libratory 
hero and the mule becomes a figure of the community. 
Interestingly, in the mule baiting scene, language (and money) with the power to 
free the mule appears as either inadequate or superfluous in meaningful communicative 
exchange. Instead, the nonverbal orchestrates much of the action. The mule here is a 
figure whose being both relies on linguistic signs and refuses them. He becomes a fetish 
of sorts, a nonspeaking being that gains agency and legitimacy through the elision of 
speech, and yet, is entirely dependent on the operations of it. In terms of Janie’s laments 
and Joe’s overhearing them, the verbal and nonverbal crossings, near misses, and 
appropriations of speech surrounding the mule’s fate all emphasize how language, 
silence, and the liminal spaces in between cooperate to challenge the effective supremacy 
of voice, even in this novel that so heavily emphasizes its importance. Between Joe and 
Janie, speaking, not speaking, overhearing, and walking away, words emerge as 
fragmentary and partial expressions that only hint at the “war of defense…going on 
inside” (57). Celebrated by Janie as an emancipator, “something like George Washington 
and Lincoln,” Joe doesn’t speak, “he never said a word” (58). Agency—or rather 
consciousness—the novel suggests, does not reside in the possession of voice, which only 
articulates a partial self, many aspects of which cannot be simultaneously voiced. Davie 
argues that the novel’s attention to physicality “suggests the experiential quality in human 
life that cannot be translated into absolutes, hierarchies, or named categories” (455). Even 
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more, it suggests an experiential quality to nonhuman life as well, especially when the 
mule exceeds his status as symbol and becomes himself part of the community.  
After his release, Matt Bonner’s mule becomes “a free mule in town,” who then 
takes shape with a distinct and assertive personality. Aware that he can reliably find food 
supplied by the yard near Joe’s porch, “the mule was usually around the store like the 
other citizens,” and quickly “new lies sprung up about his free-mule doings” involving 
his being mistaken for a human family member, tagging along, or becoming bored by 
church services (58-59). His cantankerous personality and penchant for joining in 
community activities confirms Davie’s contention that the novel destabilizes hierarchies, 
but it also imbues the mule with a human-like desire to be part of the community, and just 
as radically, is accepted as such. It is the mule who has agency—who does not stay in his 
place and has not respected his animalistic borders. An unspeaking individual who takes 
part and even disrupts community doings, the mule expands the meaning of community 
beyond the human-only realm to include the nonhuman community as well. This 
embeddedness within the fabric of Eatonville means that upon his death, he receives a 
playful funeral that actually de-sanctifies what it means to be human.  
This funeral, in which the mule’s body itself serves as the oratorical platform, 
provides a space for ridiculing rites sacred to humans through the figure of the animal, 
whose life remains relatively inconsequential to the community, despite the fact that the 
novel gestures towards its inherent value. The mule’s service is performed as a “great 
ceremony” just outside of town where the people of Eatonville proceed to mock 
“everything human in death,” referring to his status as a “distinguished citizen” leaving 
“grief” in his parting (60). And yet, his eulogy does contain images of “miles of green 
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corn and cool water, a pasture of pure bran with a river of molasses” (61). Strikingly, the 
mule’s death does not provide an opportunity for mocking the idea of an animal afterlife, 
but instead for envisioning a mule’s heavenly paradise; it composes an imaginary for 
mule bliss, subtly honoring the simplicity of such desires and offering a hope (even in 
jest) that animals succeed in attaining justice, even if it comes in the afterlife. In mule 
heaven, “the dear departed brother would look down into hell and see the devil plowing 
Matt Bonner all day long in a hell-hot sun and laying the raw hide to his back” (61). The 
human as the only being to attain a just reward after death is mocked out of this 
hierarchical position, and in fact is made to pay for violating animal life, while the animal 
succeeds to a “glittering throne” where “mule-angels would have people to ride” (61). In 
playfully upending human notions of redemption, the mule funeral demonstrates an 
alignment between the human and animal, and suggests the ease with which human-
animal understanding can be achieved. Understandings that exceed species boundaries 
appeal to grief and justice for the mule. Further, this scene demonstrates how tightly the 
community’s feelings for the mule are bound up with the trauma of slavery, such that 
Matt Bonner’s imagined comeuppance elicits “mock-happy” shouts and celebrations 
(61). Luciano and Chen’s assertion that histories of dehumanization may invite a turn 
toward the nonhuman, and away from and beyond the human aligns with Hurston’s 
depiction of the mule’s treatment and the community’s celebrations of his imagined 
triumph (189). 
Deathly Accompaniments: The Wake of Vultures 
It is worth noting that early on and throughout the novel, nonhuman creatures are 
accompanied by the figure of death. And while this figure functions silently, its presence 
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alters realities for human and nonhuman alike, and also quietly instigates desperate 
responses among those who feel its approach. The buzzard ceremony following the 
mule’s funeral, for instance, sets off the novel’s arguably most fantastic scene in which 
the vultures enter the narrative as speaking agents, altering narrative expectations and 
suggesting both that other voices can speak and that the narrative is not necessarily in any 
one agent’s control. Here, once the humans depart and return to town, the vultures 
descend upon the mule’s corpse, so that narrative attention remains with the creature’s 
body.  
Once removed from the human plot, the text tunes in to a vocal discourse among 
the birds, and follows the rites of their banquet as well. Waiting for their king, who as 
“decorum demanded” sat “oblivious until he was notified” of the mule’s death, the other 
birds pace hungrily waiting for the formal proceedings commence (61). Once the king 
arrives at the body and examines it from “end to end,” he then speaks to his flock who 
answer in chorus. Assuming a clear voice and referring to the mule again as a human 
figure, the king asks three times: “What killed this man?” And the chorus responds each 
time: “Bare, bare fat.” (62). That the vultures assume voices, that they also hold a 
ceremony for the mule as man, and that they agree that it wasn’t death alone that came 
for the mule, but that indulgence, perhaps, was the cause, suggests an alternate reality 
within the novel—an unexpected jump into another narrative world. Davie suggests that 
this move upsets “any hierarchy of true over false,” as it moves “beyond proper 
boundaries, somehow out of control” (452-53). But it also suggests that the voiceless do 
possess normally unheard voices and that narrative attention can register such discourses. 
Beyond that, the scene points to animal behavior that might be deemed mercenary, 
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savage, or chaotic as actually ritualized, dignified, and organized. These birds are not the 
vultures they’re anthropocentrically made out to be; they are sophisticated in their own 
right even though that reality remains impenetrable to most humans. The novel radically 
and multiply refigures the animal in the mule’s funeral scene—acknowledging 
humanized dignity in all its creatures. 
Race and Becoming Animal in the Final Scenes 
Their Eyes Were Watching God engages early on with shifts in perspective and 
with reading bodies when they do not speak, and while some scholarly attention focuses 
on the motivations and consequences of the final scenes involving Tea Cake’s 
transformation and Janie’s murder trial, the novel has not yet been examined for the ways 
the animal and racialized associations with animality shape these scenes and shape how 
voice and voicelessness function. The final scenes, which include a devastating 
Everglades hurricane, Tea Cake’s infection with rabies following a “mad dog” bite, 
Janie’s killing of Tea Cake, and her subsequent legal exoneration present a series of 
physical encounters that explore the indistinct boundaries between human and animal, 
while also illustrating how aggressively those boundaries may be enforced (187). While 
Hurston displays a strong interest in the status and presence of animals throughout the 
novel, the transgression of the species line in its final pages exposes a range of 
perspectives on the place of the animal in both the novel and in early-twentieth-century 
American culture. Such perspectives, necessarily informed by race and gender, take the 
animal to be by turns: mournable, killable, disposable, redeemable, guilty, innocent, and 
threatening. But more so, the status of the animal, particularly that of the dog in the 
novel, is inseparable from its relationship to the racialized human.  
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Race and animality are intermingled constructs that emerge early in the novel as 
subject to dominating power structures, and also as interrelated subjectivities. 
Troublingly, even though Hurston engages in explorations of human-animal kinship at 
the beginning of the novel, she also permits Janie’s attainment of freedom to hinge on her 
denial of this association. Instead, Janie employs racialized narratives which correlate 
race with animality, and vice versa, to secure her acquittal. The institutions of state power 
in the novel go on to endorse the killing of a black man because he “becomes animal,” 
suggesting not only that (for the state) animalized humans are killable beings, but also 
that humans can become animalized—that this transitional interpretation of subjectivity is 
valid, and that it is exploitable. Further, the novel also explores the American assumption 
that animals are killable beings by their very nature. As the novel vividly reminds its 
readers, the dehumanization of African Americans by the Euroamerican state is one with 
a long history of violence that interprets black people as “subhuman” and that sees 
animality as violable (Weheliye 3). This basis allows any recognition of human animality 
to be subject to violence. As Weheliye observes, “the law pugnaciously adjudicates who 
is deserving of personhood and who is not,” and this adjudication emerges forcefully in 
Their Eyes, which engages an extensive exploration into how race and animality are co-
constituted (11). The novel strips both the status of the animal and the animality of the 
racialized human to levels that allow for extinguishability. And it firmly articulates the 
subhumanizing logics of the white American judicial system, which are buttressed by a 
disregard for animal life. Though this disregard ultimately liberates the Janie, the novel’s 
protagonist and eventual narrator, the narrative nonetheless subtly refuses to endorse the 
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white judiciary in its political devaluation of black lives, and more inconspicuously of 
animals’ rights to existence as well.  
The Animal as Killable 
In viewing these final scenes through a perspective that perceives hierarchical 
violence as predicated on notions of racial and gendered forms of dominance that 
operates conditionally, questions emerge that challenge all forms of oppression, including 
that of humans over animals. Maneesha Deckha in her work on postcolonial feminist 
conceptions of animals states that “violence was enacted against colonized human beings 
through the differentiating logic of animalization, racialization, and dehumanization” 
(539). In America, racist discourse and thought historically employed tactics of 
dehumanization or subhumanization whereby the use of animals as proxies for people of 
color worked in those discourses to “justify” the mistreatment, enslavement, and 
disenfranchisement of African Americans for centuries. The way, then, that “the human” 
functions in American culture and in legal discourse, as distinct from other life—that a 
certain conception of the human is culturally assumed to possess a life worth 
sustaining—comes into particular focus near the end of Their Eyes when the 
representation of human transformation into “animal” deems Tea Cake killable by the 
novel’s representation of judicial order. Tea Cake’s animalization and killing are 
sanctioned by a justice system conditioned to permit violence against subordinated 
beings. Race correlates with and influences perceptions of animality (and associated 
ethics) when the figure of the animal—and the transfer of animality to human—becomes 
the hinge on which Janie’s testimony rests, especially since the animal registers as both 
executable and as a victim of murder. That Janie kills Tea Cake and incorporates his 
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animality into her defense makes use of racialization and animalization as modes of 
discounting life. The “mad dog” that Tea Cake becomes is ultimately, for Janie and for 
the white legal system, a killable being, while for the black community (whose 
articulated resistance the novel does not grant voice to), he remains a victim of wrongful 
killing. 
Tea Cake’s Animal Illness 
Their Eyes privileges the perspective of a white judge and jury in determining the 
legality and circumstantial rationality for Janie Crawford’s killing of her third husband to 
defend her own life, but undercuts this view as well. While the novel concludes with a 
seeming validation of Janie’s killing, it also takes readers through her experience of 
witnessing Tea Cake’s descent into a seemingly animalized state. It then urges readers to 
sympathize with Janie as her options rapidly narrow. But the novel also subtly suggests a 
counternarrative that questions Janie’s defense, her actions, and her exoneration. Insisting 
that Tea Cake’s death is not just, and that Janie’s defense exploits discourses that conflate 
blackness and animality, the novel also presents a challenge to readings that see Tea 
Cake’s death as laudatory, necessary, and emancipatory for Janie.  
Tea Cake’s troubles begin near the novel’s end. Janie’s third husband is an 
abusive bon vivant who gambles, suffers suspicious jealousy, and whom Janie loves far 
more than her previous two husbands. After Janie and Tea Cake depart Eatonville 
together to work and live in the Everglades, a hurricane strikes, which leaves all 
semblances of infrastructural and hierarchical order in disarray. As Glenda Carpio notes, 
the hurricane scene highlights the human loss of and desire for “power and control” 
which appears most prominently once it is lost (135). Janie and Tea Cake find themselves 
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washed away in the storm’s subsequent flood, where Janie saves herself only by grabbing 
the tail of a passing cow as it floats by caught in the torrents. This animal, however, is 
already occupied—a dog stands atop its back “shivering and growling” (165). No docile 
creature, “the dog stood up and growled like a lion, stiff-standing hackles, stiff muscles, 
teeth uncovered as he lashed up his fury for the charge” (166). Since it threatens to attack 
Janie should she come within reach of its jaws, Tea Cake enters the bodily fray of human 
and animal convergence; he stabs the threatening dog with a knife, sending it “to the 
bottom to stay there” (166). But before the dog sinks to its watery grave, it sinks its teeth 
into Tea Cake’s cheekbone. Though he discounts the bite as nothing serious, weeks later 
Tea Cake begins to develop symptoms of serious illness, and the bite’s severity becomes 
known. Plagued suddenly with hydrophobia, paranoia, bouts of temper, fever, and 
malaise, the local white doctor diagnoses Tea Cake with rabies, which by the time of its 
identification has progressed beyond the point of cure. Janie asks the doctor if Tea Cake 
is likely to die, and the doctor affirms he is, adding that “de worst thing is he’s liable tuh 
suffer somethin’ awful befo’ he goes” (177). The doctor suggests sending him to the 
hospital, but Janie responds: “Ah can’t stand de idea us tyin’ Tea Cake lak he wuz a mad 
dawg” (177). From that point on in the novel, Tea Cake becomes increasingly ill, so 
much so that Janie avoids him so as not to confront the “sickness in his face” (178).  
Interestingly, Janie’s interactions with Tea Cake during his final days recognize 
his condition—marked by terror, fits, nightmares, and the inability to eat or drink—as 
illness. Janie tells Tea Cake he is sick, “too sick fuh me tuh handle” as she waits for 
medicine to arrive that might provide some relief (182). While the narration describes 
Tea Cake as having been seized by a “thing that set his brains afire and grabbed at his 
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throat with iron fingers,” Janie refuses to send him away for care, worried that “folks 
would…treat Tea Cake like he was some mad dog when nobody in the world had more 
kindness about them” (178, 183). Finally, a breaking point is reached and Tea Cake with 
his “suffering brain urging him to kill” confronts Janie with a gun, convinced she’s been 
having an affair while he’s been sick in bed (183). He shoots three blank shots at her, and 
when he finally fires a real bullet and misses, Janie shoots him with a rifle and he dies, 
biting her arm as he falls to the floor.  
The scenes in which Tea Cake becomes ill and in which he dies can be read 
against the court room scene at the novel’s end as complicating and illuminating how 
narratives of animality become dangerous forms of control and brutality. While the novel 
plays with explorations of the nonhuman when threats of violence are less immediate, the 
trial scene illustrates how threatening such associations can be in a racialized context. 
Janie goes to court for Tea Cake’s killing, and though the narration does not transcribe 
her testimony, the text provides a paraphrase of her own spoken defense, and also reveals 
a change in her perspective regarding Tea Cake’s condition. There, on the stand:  
She tried to make them see how terrible it was that things were fixed so that Tea 
 Cake couldn’t come back to himself until he had got rid of that mad dog that was 
 in him and he couldn’t get rid of the dog and live. He had to die to get rid of the 
 dog. (187)  
While Janie had in the days previous described Tea Cake as sick—so sick she was 
worried he would be treated like a mad dog—here she relies on the law’s political 
imagining and creation of racialized animality to defend her killing. Tea Cake’s death 
here is justified, or in fact necessary because he—according to Janie’s defense—becomes 
animal. And she implies that there is no unbecoming animal, instead “he must die to beat 
it” (187).  
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The depiction of Tea Cake’s sanctioned killing ultimately draws attention to the 
ways that the boundaries of the human are, in fact, radically destabilized and examined in 
the novel—both in terms of Tea Cake’s transformative illness and in the figurative work 
that the narrative does to draw parallel connections between its characters, human and 
nonhuman. As Elizabeth. Povinelli’s notes of “The Virus” as “the figure…which seeks to 
disrupt…the division of Life and Nonlife,” the rabies virus in Their Eyes can be read as 
an infectious agent that draws attention to the associated vulnerabilities of both human 
and nonhuman, in this case a man and a dog (19). While the novel makes plain a sort of 
kinship of vulnerability, it also highlights the failings of the juridical order to 
acknowledge or account for this relationship – to account for the human as never 
singularly capable of species autonomy. Such an order does not – or perhaps cannot – 
account for such vital “entanglements” when, as Povinelli notes, our scale of “perception 
is confined to the skin, to a set of epidermal enclosures” (42). And this idea also pervades 
the novel, particularly in the courtroom scene where the legal proceedings are choked by 
racism. What Laura Korobkin calls “the reflexive racism of the white legal system” 
already demonstrates the limits of a legal order that refuses to value or equally protect 
nonwhite human lives, and thus cannot account for a human entangled with a virus below 
his epidermal surface (12). At its most visible, it is violence, its control, and its 
supervision that illustrate how defending the epistemology of “the human” works. 
Tea Cake’s dehumanization, which permits Janie to fatally shoot him without 
judicial consequence, suggests a legal framework that supports Janie’s interiorization of 
her motivations. If indeed Tea Cake has a mad dog within, he becomes no longer human, 
and his nonhuman status renders him killable. Presenting a variety of humanist and 
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posthumanist problems that center upon the law’s assumption of a universal humanistic 
conception of defendable life, that Janie shoots Teacake with impunity demonstrates 
ways that racialization and animalization are state-sanctioned modes of discounting 
human life. In her reliance on discourse that conforms to a white racist notion of 
animality as associated with blackness, she works to defend her killing of Tea Cake to the 
white legal powers in the courtroom. Janie manipulates discourses of racialized 
dehumanization to justify her killing as the narrative also illustrates how law’s power 
relies on silence and the denial of voice to maintain and adjudicate outcomes that produce 
inhumanity.  
Testimonial Approximations 
Janie is put on trial for Tea Cake’s death and found not guilty by a white judge 
and jury as she invokes Tea Cake’s having become animal as the key to her defense. 
Contrary to Gates’s claim that it is in the trial scene that Janie secures her voice, her 
actual testimonial speech goes undepicted and is instead summarized with a third-person 
narrative account of Janie’s intentions in testifying in defense of her actions. Scholars 
examining this scene to explore how Janie negotiates her experience to claim self-defense 
and to free herself from the confines of marriage once and for all have noted that Janie 
“shapes her testimony to her audience—the white judicial system” (Russell 58). 
DuPlessis states that in that scene, Janie chooses “to speak to white women” as she 
believes them most likely to sympathize with her defense (109). James Phelan suggests 
that “Hurston would face a difficult task in writing a speech that both white men in the 
courtroom and her audience would find consistent” and thus leaves Janie’s voice 
untranscribed, and directed toward those who hold her fate in their hands (72). Laura 
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Korobkin examines how Janie’s “accidental” killing of Tea Cake (according to the 
courtroom verdict) erases her agency. Taken together, these scholarly approaches to the 
scene acknowledge that Janie’s testimony does not represent her voice, but relies on a 
narrative remove to record her intention to “let them know…she could never shoot Tea 
Cake out of malice” (187).  
In the courtroom scene, voice, free indirect discourse, paraphrase, and silencing 
all work to cast suspicion on those denied voice, which then creates precarious positions 
in that space. DuPlessis observes that “the trial scene is the main place in which race and 
gender…show intense cross-purposes and mutual conflicts in their narrative impact” 
(102). As Janie is put on trial, the courtroom reflects the ways in which political 
disenfranchisement takes both shape and voice. The narration describes a white judge, 
“twelve more white men…[and] eight or ten white women [who] had come to look at 
her,” as well as two men (the prosecution and the defense lawyers) who will argue over 
her sentence: the death penalty. And then, moving away from the white staging of power, 
narrative attention shifts to “all of the colored people standing up in the back of the 
courtroom” (185). The black community, “packed tight like a case of celery,” is 
described as plant life where they also move and sway “like wind among palm trees” 
(185, 186). But as Janie sees it, “they were there with their tongues cocked and loaded… 
the only killing tool they are allowed to use in the presence of white folks” (185-186). 
And though many of them wish to testify—“they had come to talk, the State couldn’t rest 
until it heard”—when Sop-de-Bottom tells the prosecutor he has something to say, he is 
threatened with arrest and arraignment (187). The prosecutor makes this explicit when he 
tells the community: “another word out of you […] and I’ll bind you over to the big 
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court” (187). Thus, voice is denied to Tea Cake’s steadfast representatives, so that 
testimony—the one form of power this group might have under the law—is not an 
option, and becomes in fact a risk.  
The courtroom scene demonstrates how Tea Cake’s friends are denied voice (their 
only weapon, as Janie sees it) and denied rights through forceful silencing. This muting 
as a form of deprivation is ultimately dehumanizing. Megan Glick likens racialized 
political disenfranchisement “to the state of the animal, to a life without rights” 
(642).Where the law in this scene denies speech to those it deems less than human, in 
doing so, it produces a dehumanized subject. And thus, Tea Cake’s advocates are figured 
in a way that Janie can use in her defense of her husband’s death. That is to say, his 
friends are also animalized in a way that Janie exploits in arguing that Tea Cake had 
become an animal. Though the black community disagrees with the final verdict, and 
Janie sees her own exercise of violence as one predicated on Tea Cake becoming 
“like…some mad dog,” the legal acceptance of her deployment of lethal force defends 
conceptions of race that employ discourses of animality (187). For the state, whose 
foundations rest on the deployment of violence, animalized humans are killable beings.  
That the novel does not transcribe Janie’s testimony suggests a competing set of 
narrative implications. While testimony transcriptions are already documents of erasure, 
in that tone, gesture, body language, silence, and verbal pace are not recorded, the 
narrative refuses to endorse such a practice and instead provides Janie’s intention through 
free indirect discourse. While the courtroom “leaned over to listen while she talked,” the 
reader does not encounter her speech, but instead reads her thoughts which express a 
need “to remember she was not at home. She was in the courthouse fighting something 
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and it wasn’t death…It was lying thoughts” (187). The lying thoughts that Janie fights, 
however, are not made explicit, and in fact, the paraphrase of her testimony suggests that 
her intention to speak the truth does not align with the words she spoke about Tea Cake 
before his death. Though he was sick and ailing while alive, according to Janie, in the 
courtroom, he had a “mad dog that was in him” (187). That the narrative does not provide 
Janie’s voice, but instead explains her testimonial intention to present Tea Cake as 
possessed and as nonhuman, rather than as an ill man aligns her intended testimony with 
the white racism that directs the proceedings. To read Janie’s speech too closely and 
clearly, the novel suggests, might betray her testimonial alignment with the discourse of 
the state that seeks to justify Tea Cake’s killing. It would also break too clearly with 
Janie’s earlier assertions of concern for his health and condition. 
Ironically, the thing Janie purports to fear most is misunderstanding, and not the 
death penalty which she faces if found guilty. Misunderstanding, she believes, “was 
worse than murder” (187). And yet this scene displays a series of misunderstandings: 
through silencing, through a misrepresentation of Tea Cake’s being, and through a verdict 
that deems his death “accidental and justifiable” (188). By dehumanizing Tea Cake, and 
denying his peers the right to speak on his behalf, the white representatives of the law 
make the figure of Tea Cake into what he’s always been in their eyes—what Claire Jean 
Kim describes as a “persistent racial trope”: the black man as “violent beast” (23). Janie’s 
release demonstrates how the law in an early-twentieth-century Florida courtroom 
sanctions the violent death of the dehumanized subject. At the same time, the narrative 
subtly challenges this outcome, through the black community, who shuffle out of the 
courtroom, shaking their heads—a silent refute to her defense. Silence becomes not a 
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form of acquiescence nor even resignation, but a contest in itself, to the failures of 
language, the law, and its power to articulate justice. 
Through this depiction, the novel suggests an alternative moral paradigm at work 
within the text, one which does not accept a ‘dehumanized’ Teacake as murderable. After 
Janie is found not guilty for Tea Cake’s death, the text remarks on an approving white 
contingent in the courtroom, and a dismayed black community. While the white judge 
and jury find Tea Cake’s execution pardonable for his having a “mad dog” within, the 
novel echoes centuries of dehumanizing logics used to justify violence and murder, while 
also contesting (through the black community) the notion of dehumanization. This 
demonstrates how a rejection of dehumanization avows human-animal connection in the 
novel, where an unsettling series of events raise questions about how and why the animal 
is so conceived as inhuman by the white American state. One way is through a 
conception of the animal that views it as predatory and malevolent. While the rabid dog 
does bite Tea Cake so that they consequently experience a similar decline through the 
virus that attacks them both—they share that vulnerability—Tea Cake does not (as Janie 
argues) become a mad dog. He becomes ill just as the dog did. That Janie’s testimony 
connects them through the foaming chaos of illness is especially dangerous because it 
animalizes them both. Her defense invokes animality as raving and ferocious, which 
white racializing constructions deploy as a means of subjugation and devaluation. At the 
same time, as the narrative demonstrates, in the moment of confrontation Janie defends 
herself against Tea Cake as she must do, and she likely spares him unceasing suffering. 
But since her legal defense frames her self-defense in a way that justifies and employs 
anti-black racism, it complicates the trial scene profoundly. But yet again, Janie must 
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defend herself in the courtroom as well, within the white persecutorial space of 
sanctioned legal violence. By appealing to the white women present, by attempting to 
align herself with them, she positions herself against the beastial black man as a way of 
establishing her own personhood. This is her unspoken defense, and the black community 
seems to hear it clearly.  
Janie’s return home following the trial, to a space of silence after her exertion of 
voice, concludes with the suggestion that something can be heard in the absence of 
language, where a moment of silence finally brings her peace. At the novel’s conclusion, 
Janie Crawford finally returns to Eatonville, to a house that could only be livable after 
she “been tuh de horizon and back” (191). As she remarks upon her return: “Dis house 
ain’t so absent of things lak it used tuh be befo’ Tea Cake come along. It’s full uh 
thoughts” (225). Materially imbued with memory and meaning, the house Janie returns to 
is a quiet space filled with thoughts that, to borrow Jane Bennett’s phrase, takes on a “a 
vitality intrinsic to materiality” (xiii). The final paragraphs describe not just the silence 
that surrounds Janie, who must first sweep out “the fetid feeling of absence and 
nothingness” that occupies the space, but goes on to describe the sounds of “a sobbing 
sigh out of every corner in the room; out of each and every chair and thing” (227). 
Though Janie’s voice and her control of the narrative ensured her eventual freedom, in 
silence she hears the unspeaking matter that surrounds her and finally finds “peace” 
(227). The house, when it “commenced to sing, commenced to sob and sigh, singing and 
sobbing,” points to the vibrancy that things can hold despite or because of their histories. 
Hurston presents a vision of listening to the sighs and sobs things hold. As Bennett says, 
of the “shared materiality of all things,” there is an “incomplete commonality with the 
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outside [domain of] animals, plants, earth, even artifacts and commodities” (17-18). And 
Their Eyes suggests that cultivating a connection to this shared materiality ultimately 
grants Janie tranquility. 
Conclusion 
As Their Eyes plays with narrative perspectives and with nonverbal 
communications, and as the court scene demonstrates how voice, silence, thought, and 
intention challenge the idea that veracity can be achieved through explicit language, 
Janie’s words—those that are spoken, and those that determine outcomes but are not 
transcribed—signal a narrative that, like its protagonist, cannot settle in stasis. Language 
alters perception, it determines realities, and it fails to articulate any sort of truth, the 
existence of which the novel implicitly questions. The novel’s persistent depictions of 
silence, of unexplained decisions, and of bodily experiences that prevail over a language 
that distorts suggests a modernist novel that counters the strength of language with the 
power of the unspoken. It acknowledges that so much goes unheard, that what is heard 
must be seen for the sliver of reliable representation that it is—that to understand is to 
hear what is not said.  
While the novel certainly demonstrates the sociopolitical power of verbal control 
and transmission, it also undercuts a stable allegiance to the idea that verbalization serves 
as the truest expression of autonomous power. Rather, Their Eyes suggests that discourse 
disempowers, and actually de-agentializes Janie at crucial moments in the text. And 
conversely, it suggests that silence possesses a different sort of power in the text that has 
gone quietly unrecognized. The novel’s form and its capricious vacillations in narrative 
voice may actually draw attention to the routes that certain voices trace, to the ideological 
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ties that discourses have to points of view. That Janie’s voice does not sound her own 
testimony, that voices that attempt to defend Tea Cake are silenced, and that 
soundlessness concludes the novel all suggest a counter reading to celebrations of the 
novel’s verbal flourishing. With its dynamic and multivocal narrative, Their Eyes 
displaces the stability of the single, authoritative voice with a set of voices, and a 
preoccupation with the voiceless. Through this form, the authority of a white form of 
humanism becomes unsettled as well. This ideological adherence to an idealized, 
masculine sense of the human and the human voice, is thrust aside perpetually, creating 
space for the emergence of different voices, and for the depiction of bodies who do not 
speak. As such, the novel troubles what it means to associate human agency so directly 







ALTERIOR MOTIVES: MULTIDIMENSIONAL REPRESENTATIONS OF 
ANIMALS IN ZITKALA-ŠA’S OLD INDIAN LEGENDS 
At the turn of the twentieth century, stories of talking bears, clothed badgers, and 
kidnapping toads may not have seemed entirely novel to American audiences. After all, 
Beatrix Potter’s The Tale of Peter Rabbit published in 1902 situated readers in an 
anthropomorphized household of rabbits, while Rudyard Kipling’s Just So Stories 
published that same year featured fanciful creatures with creational powers and advanced 
vocabularies. Meanwhile, Joel Chandler Harris’s Uncle Remus stories had appeared in 
print two decades prior, introducing readers to African-American oral storytelling 
through characters like Brer Rabbit and Brer Fox. Yet the publication in 1901 of Zitkala-
Ša’s Old Indian Legends offered something different to readers of stories about animals 
who speak, think, and act with ethical consideration. Her collection—the first published 
English translation of Dakota oral literature—presented to readers a textual world in 
which animal characters figured as conceivably human, and vice versa.1 In Zitkala-Ša’s 
stories, animals speak, they understand one another, and they enact moral lessons, as they 
do in other contemporaneous volumes of animal-populated literature, but remarkably 
unusual in Old Indian Legends are the ways that a sort of dual- or multi-species identity 
emerges among characters in this collection. While the ability to transmutate definitively 
                                                 
1 I refer to Old Indian Legends as Dakota tales since Zitkala-Ša explains in the Preface that “old Dakota 
story-tellers have told me these legends” (v). I also refer to Sioux cultural practices in this article when 
talking more broadly about the seven tribes native to the plains region of present-day Minnesota, Northern 
Iowa, Nebraska, and North and South Dakota, which formed an enduring political and cultural alliance. As 
Mark Rifkin notes, however, Sioux is a “misnomer” that is a French interpretation of “an Ojibwa insult” for 
those plains tribes (51). Dakota (which is sometimes used as a more general term for Sioux), Lakota, and 
Nakota are language divisions of the Santee, Teton, and Yankton tribes, respectively. Zitkala-Ša was born 
and raised speaking Nakota, though she later changed her name to Zitkala-Ša—a Lakota name. Further, she 
self-identified as Dakota (Rifkin 29; Spack 43).         
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from one form to another remains the sole province of the trickster Iktomi, the stories 
suggest this capacity prevails in less obvious ways among the many different animal 
characters portrayed. A combined reading of the original 1901 text and its accompanying 
illustrations generates an imaginary of hybrid or transformative beings when humans 
visually materialize in images that appear alongside the textual animal characters that 
they represent. An interplay between text and image destabilizes the solidity of discrete 
ontologies when animals function narratively as human representatives, and humans then 
appear comfortably as visual substitutes for animal protagonists. Through this 
interchange emerges a textual demonstration of how Dakota systems of knowledge 
understand the complex, organic continuum of human-animal relatedness. Consequently, 
the text presents a literal rebuke to Western/Euroamerican conceptions of species 
hierarchy, animal inferiority and disposability, and the notion that human-animal 
comparisons are profoundly threatening. In Old Indian Legends, animals figure 
prominently as kin, echoing a long history of shared ecological dwelling and cooperative 
existence, and in these stories, the opportunity for humans to inhabit nonhuman being is 
not debasing, but is instead elevating.  
This essay engages critical animal studies in its approach to Old Indian Legends 
as a text that offers new ways of viewing the human-animal relationship through a 
literary analysis that combines word and image to read animals as people, and people as 
animals. Through an imaginative interchange whereby humans materialize visually to 
portray animal characters, notions of hierarchy between species give way to explorations 
of relationality and conceptions of kinship. Engaging with animal studies work by Native 
scholars (and Native studies scholars), this paper explores how Indian perceptions of 
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nonhumans as fellow agential beings come through the text both despite and because 
animals serve as personified humans or political entities. First published in a political and 
social context in which the United States actively pursued Native elimination through 
assimilation, these stories imagine radically different transformations that reject ideas of 
hegemonic ascendency and instead welcome plurality with the rest of the living world.       
Where Words and Image Merge Through Difference 
Of particular interest in this essay is the way in which Zitkala-Ša’s stories (as 
originally published) combine with their accompanying illustrations to defamiliarize the 
ontologies of the characters they represent. The original 1901 publication of Old Indian 
Legends (as well as a 1985 reprint) feature illustrations that were completed by Zitkala-
Ša’s friend, the Winnebago artist Angel De Cora, a well-known Native artist who 
enjoyed a career in fine art and as an illustrator for books by and about Native people 
(Vigil 178).2 While more recent publications omit De Cora’s work, reading the original 
1901 version with its illustrations provides vital context for comprehending how Old 
Indian Legends negotiated the narrative terrain surrounding stories about animals. Rather 
than infantilize animals, the text represented them as informed by a Native view that 
perceives an easy changeability between human beings and animals, where one can 
become the other with little trouble, physically or ontologically. What’s more, the 
illustrations give visual proof to this multifocal way of seeing animal characters who are 
all the while human—animal characters who are perhaps human from the start in that 
they speak, they interact, they obey (or disobey) codes of behavior—but are animal in 
their assigned textual roles.  
                                                 
2 De Cora illustrated the frontispiece for Francis LeFlesche’s The Middle Five: Indian Boys at School 
(1900) and illustrated a book by Elaine Goodale Eastman, Yellow Star: A Story of East and West (1911), 
along with numerous magazine contributions (Vigil 178). 
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Zitkala-Ša’s writing with the complement of De Cora’s illustrations signify a 
relationship in which humans learn from animals by inhabiting their roles and sometimes 
their forms, and thus refuse notions of human superiority—and more importantly, refute 
hierarchical conceptions of supremacy—in favor of an ethic that champions 
transformation as a way of being human. Linda Hogan writes that Native intellectual 
traditions reflect thousands of years of lived experience, which always included life 
among (and thus a kinship with) animal beings who all predate the appearance of humans 
so that what “is remembered in stories are the deepest reflections of our shared lives on 
Earth” (10). Through stories, she writes, “the bridge between one kind of intelligence and 
another, one species and another” are kept alive (Hogan 10). De Cora’s work gestures 
toward this knowledge throughout the collection, just as it suggests that the things that 
the Western mind might view as setting humans apart, such as a shared language, are 
perhaps overestimated. The book opens, for instance, to a frontispiece that unfolds 
adjacent to the cover page; it depicts a Dakota man bowing with arms stretched toward 
the feet of a Dakota woman who stands opposite (Figure 1). The caption that 
accompanies the illustration explains: “This was a sign of gratitude used when words 
failed to interpret strong emotion” and thus gestures before the text even begins to the 
inadequacy of verbal language to communicate the depth of inner experience. Within this 
textual universe, animal characters possess and deploy language, while some humans find 
it inadequate—suggesting animals to be capable of complex interactions, while human 
beings may communicate more meaningfully without verbal consignment. 
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  Figure 1: Frontispiece 
Important as a document that records legends which present a contest to Western 
constructions of animals as separate and diminished, the collection of fourteen stories that 
comprises Old Indian Legends draws on traditional Dakota oral tales that (at the age of 
twenty-five) Zitkala-Ša gathered by visiting tribal elders, and transcribing and translating 
stories she feared might otherwise go unrecorded and forgotten. Hers was the first of 
several early-twentieth-century collections of Dakota oral literature published in an effort 
to preserve and circulate Indian cultural traditions while also asserting their value to a 
largely Euroamerican audience.3 As Zitkala-Ša describes in a 1901 letter, a sense of 
urgency compelled her to gather traditional stories “while the old people last…to get 
from them their reassured ideas of life” (Enoch 119).4 She achieved this goal when in 
1901 Boston’s Ginn and Company published Old Indian Legends, her first full-length 
work. This compilation of traditional Sioux oral legends featured Iktomi the trickster, 
personified animals, and Iya the eater as reoccurring characters.  
                                                 
3 Ella Deloria’s Dakota Texts (1932); Marie McLaughlin’s Myths and Legends of the Sioux (1916); and 
Charles and Elaine Eastman’s Wigwam Evenings (1909). 
4 Written in a February 1901 letter to her then fiancée Carlos Montezuma.  
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The legends, as she writes in the book’s preface, are a composite of many voices 
over time and are thus imparted with particular vibrancy, which she describes as “the 
native spirit” (89). This very spirit is what Paula Gunn Allen writes must be encountered 
“experientially” and not by the “adding-machine mind” (105). Within this tradition, Gunn 
Allen explains that such stories rely on symbols to articulate meanings, and through 
symbology “re-create and renew our ancient relationship to the universe” (106). 
Accordingly, this collection offers readers entrée to a worldview that discerns a coherent 
unity between beings. This concept emerges most perceptibly through the parts animal 
characters play in often representing human beings. More specifically, animals come to 
symbolize personality attributes; they often speak and interact with one another, either 
upholding or disrupting conscionable codes of behavior. Their bodily descriptions, by 
extension, become tied to ways of being and seeing so that the predatorily enabling 
physical features of a bear, for instance, come to represent the ravages of colonial 
domination. Yet the ready symbolic exchange between human and animal suggests—
even beyond social and political critique—that the stories convey what Gunn Allen 
describes as “insights that have not been raised to conscious articulation” (117). Such 
insights, Old Indian Legends suggests, include perceiving relationships between humans 
and animals as generative rather than reductive in that we see more clearly who we are 
through our symbolic embodiments as animals.  
The illustrations work with the text to challenge what Hogan describes as the 
“Western mind” and its “way of living in the world” without a surviving “trust between 
human and animal” (11). Hogan’s essay “First People” explores how many Native 
cultures the world over, and particularly in North America, have stories that describe 
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earlier times when humans and animals were “the same kind of people” and when (for 
some cultures) “animals changed into human form, or humans became animals” (8). 
Additionally, Philippe Descola in his global investigation of cultural perceptions of 
animals in Beyond Nature and Culture observes that “the continuity between humans and 
nonhumans” constitutes lived experience in much of the world and especially in 
indigenous cultures where communication with the environment is customary (27). 
Descola importantly argues that the Western view of animals and the environment as 
separate and “incommunicable” spheres is an unusual epistemology threatening in that it 
not only alienates humans from the rest of the world but also offers a way of rationalizing 
exploitation of animals and the environment as resources to be mined (30). Hogan’s 
essay, instrumental in explaining how Native oral literature illuminates a culture’s 
knowledge and approach to nonhuman life, details the ways that animals were (and 
continue to be) seen as fellow people—as those with whom humans share trust, and who 
exist as “powers” in their “states of being, gifts, or capabilities” (10). She writes that “for 
tribal cultures, animals are still seen as kith and kin, as other nations of people who have 
different intelligences from ours” (Hogan 17). It was the Western tradition that altered 
this collective understanding on the American continent, she contends, where going back 
to Roman times, animals were seen “as everything except what they were”: as symbols, 
myths, monsters, royalty (Hogan 17). This symbolic relegation, along with the 
concomitant physical enclosing of animals (zoos, parks, homes, etc.), keeps modern 
people from knowing animals, such that “we have become the boundary [and] we define 
the borders” (Hogan 17). De Cora’s illustrations dissolve the very lines of those borders 
and redraw them without calling attention to their potential unexpectedness. Her visual 
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substitutions of human for animal cooperate with Zitkala-Ša’s verbal representations of 
human by animal to elaborate the fundamentally intertwined relationship that Dakota 
systems of belief observe between human and nonhuman—and the interaction between 
literature and illustration communicate this more fully that either medium might do 
separately. 
The Legends as a Material Rebuke to Indian Eradication 
Born Gertrude Bonnin in 1876 and raised on the Yankton Sioux Reservation in 
South Dakota, at the age of eight, Zitkala-Ša was taken from home to attend White’s 
Manual Labor Institute, a Quaker school in Indiana, an experience she recounts 
fictionally in American Indian Stories as one in which she endured the violence of 
assimilationist education, and then returned to her tribal family with feelings of deep 
alienation that left her hanging “in the heart of chaos” (ZS 28). Zitkala-Ša continued to 
attend school in Indiana, but in 1897, upon leaving Earlham College, she renounced her 
Western name and adopted the pen name Zitkala-Ša (Red Bird) instead (Vigil 165). She 
went on to teach at the Carlisle School in Pennsylvania until 1899 when disagreements 
with the school’s headmaster compelled her to relocate to Boston to play violin at the 
New England Conservatory (Vigil 166). From there, Zitkala-Ša returned home to South 
Dakota collect the stories that would be printed as Old Indian Legends. 
The political context of the time, in which Indian removal from traditional lands 
contracted tribal territories into ever smaller plots ultimately concluding in allotment 
policy, and in which children were taken into Euroamerican cultural custody as part of an 
assimilative educational effort, is addressed more prominently in Zitkala-Ša’s American 
Indian Stories, but experiences of cultural erasure and removal with which she was so 
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directly acquainted play into the stories of Old Indian Legends as well. The book 
appeared at a time when political and social movements continued to further 
disenfranchise Indian people. Old Indian Legends was published fourteen years after the 
Congressional passage of the Dawes General Allotment Act in 1887 which broke large 
tribal territories (which had already been greatly reduced by the Treaty of Fort Laramie in 
1868) into 165-acre plots to be farmed and occupied by single families. The Act was a 
federal governmental effort to “civilize” Sioux Indians; Henry Dawes asserted that 
civilized citizens were those who endeavored to “cultivate the ground, live in 
houses…[and] own property” (Hyde 169). This colonizing effort was in part fueled by 
the Euroamerican cultural notion that the Sioux must be reformed from communal, 
seasonally nomadic people to settled, individualistic citizens with single-family 
commitments. Such governmental efforts asserted that Indians would be legitimate 
citizens once they embraced national values of ownership, individualist separation, and 
large-scale agricultural manipulation. So-called reforms were fueled as much by 
colonialist avarice as by messages that relied on the idea of Indians as savage, close to 
nature, and in need of civilizing.  
As it was, the American racializing imagination constructed Native people as 
figures who were either ecologically attuned or savagely unreformed. As Claire Jean Kim 
points out in her examination of the interplay between race and conceptions of the 
animal, the savage Indian and the ecological Indian have long been “stock characters in 
the American cultural imaginary” (235). It was—and continues to be—this presumed 
association of “embeddedness in nature” that feeds an imagined “quasi-animality” of 
Native people (Kim 235). Within this context then, what’s remarkable about Zitkala-Ša’s 
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collection of tales is its willing conflation of Dakota people and animal characters such 
that associations and intermingling between species are embraced as part of greater truth 
about what it means to be human. These tales take readers out of so-called civilized 
spaces and into a realm of ecologic continuity where understanding and communion 
between humans and nonhumans produces a fuller world. Through the act of bringing 
traditional Sioux stories into print for an English-speaking audience, Zitkala-Ša asserts 
resistance to Indian erasure by working to preserve Dakota stories, while also 
demonstrating Sioux cultural worth to a society bent on eradicating it. The stories go 
further in their assertion of a cultural knowledge system that views relationships between 
beings as inter-ontological rather than wholly separate and opaque, and thus through the 
tales Zitkala-Ša denies (in many ways) an allegiance to a Western worldview. 
Interestingly, Zitkala-Ša presents her work as belonging “quite as much to the blue-eyed 
little patriot as to the black-haired aborigine,” as she explains in the book’s preface (vi).  
The book is both one of didactic intention aimed at a young white audience and 
an assertion of Dakota sovereignty. By functioning in both ways, it rebukes the recently 
arrived Euroamericans and their land grab by offering tales that critique such 
acquisitiveness and a present another way of knowing. With this introduction, she 
bestows the English-language text upon a young white audience as part of a shared 
heritage. But with this she also undercuts a sense of blue-eyed longevity in the US by 
remarking that only “in the last few centuries has [America] acquired a second tongue,” 
which thus necessitates such a translation (89). The preface to Old Indian Legends, 
though it does subtly undercut, as Jeanne Smith argues, “the sense of superiority” a white 
audience might bring to this collection, also anticipates optimistically that engaging the 
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interest of the young will spur an interest among adults in Dakota beliefs (Smith 48). In 
the prefatory address to the reader, Zitkala-Ša anticipates the Legends’ young audience, 
once “grown tall like the wise grown-ups,” will display an interest in “a further study of 
Indian folklore” (vi). The preface straightforwardly expresses an intent to interest 
Euroamerican children in Native traditions, and to share with them long-told stories. 
However, Ruth Spack argues that these tales work to “reclaim Dakota values” from the 
missionary education, which forced Zitkala-Ša to relinquish them (47). By translating 
these tales into English and intending them for a young audience, Spack writes that 
Zitkala-Ša “uses English to promote Dakota ways of knowing, inverting the missionaries’ 
use of Dakota to promote a Euroamerican worldview” (48). Jeffrey Myers agrees that Old 
Indian Legends may be read as a subversion of children’s literature in that it instructs 
readers in the “codes of Lakota-Dakota behavior,” with these lessons aimed not just at 
children, but at “recently arrived Euroamericans [who] are children…clearly in need of 
instruction as to how to behave in relation to other people and beings in the natural 
world” (122). While the presence of personified animal characters and mythic figures 
may have appealed to an audience of children, the tales unquestionably communicate 
Dakota mores and principles as they model the victories and consequences of 
(un)conscionable behavior and the perils of transgressions.  
Old Indian Legends goes on to present tales that allegorically depict the 
depredations of greed, conquest, and lack of respect for the natural world, while the 
stories also demonstrate a worldview outside of the colonial order—one that seeks justice 
through a trust in nature and in the compassionate capacities of humanity to reconcile. 
Through the representation of animals, Zitkala-Ša’s writing demonstrates a sense of 
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relationality that functions through ideas of fluidity, non-hierarchy, and perspectives that 
embrace alterity. Meanwhile, Zitkala-Ša’s orientation toward the Euroamerican nation, 
which would inform her life-long efforts to secure Indian land rights and citizenship 
through legal reform, is articulated in the book’s opening pages as one that does not 
express idealist notions about a return to precontact conditions (she doesn’t call for a 
dissolution of the US), but instead asks for space to be made within it. In its offering of 
accord through the sharing of stories, which “are relics of our country’s once virgin soil,” 
her preface introduces an ethic of radical forgiveness, trust, and the co-existence of 
cultures (v). It offers to its readers not only traditional legends, but an invitation and 
introduction to a Sioux culture which had, by the very audience to which it appeals, been 
cruelly annexed, brutalized, killed, and systematically disempowered. In her affirmation 
of Native “kinship with the rest of humanity” and “toward the great brotherhood of man,” 
Zitkala-Ša asserts an open-handed position that continues to recognize kinship despite 
recent and contemporaneous violations of humane relationships (vi). The Legends work 
to preserve and affirm Dakota culture and propose a correction to colonial violence 
through this affirmation of culture that views continuity between beings.  
Native Animal Studies and Critical Readings of Old Indian Legends 
In the last few years, critical work has begun to look at the ways animals function 
in Native literature in an effort to articulate and appreciate the “interspecies ethic” 
modeled in texts by Native writers (Ladino 29). As Hogan explains, Native stories about 
animals derive from “considerable and elaborate systems of knowledge, intellectual 
traditions and ways of living that were tried, tested, and found true” over millennia (11). 
Work by Brian Hudson urges scholars to read Native literature as already informed by 
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ideologies that “do not define humans as categorically different from or superior to 
nonhuman animals” (3). And writing in PMLA, Christopher Pexa, in an article that 
examines Charles Alexander Eastman’s collection of Dakota tales, records the ways that 
tiospaye (or extended family) functions as a decolonial gesture through its inclusion of 
animals within the kinship circle, thereby challenging colonial and settler state notions of 
what it means to be a person and a citizen.5 This approach to Old Indian Legends seeks to 
explore how animal characters—personified humans though they be—provide readers a 
way of viewing the human-animal relationship from a less categorical perspective. 
An apprehension of these ideologies through literature promises a way of 
enlarging the potential of posthumanism and limiting the suffering of animals, since 
contemporary modes of confinement, experimentation, killing, ecological destruction, 
climate change, and globalized pollution all rely on a logic that views animal life as 
nongrievable and expendable. By upsetting this assumption and showing another way, an 
epistemology that does not rely on discounting the value of “others” who are 
“categorically different,” Native literature evades a Western speciesist worldview which 
weaponizes dehumanization by placing the human at the apex of worldly life.6  
As of yet, and despite its significance as the first Native-American–authored 
collection of traditional Dakota oral tales, Old Indian Legends has been largely neglected 
by literary scholars.7 While analyses of Zitkala-Ša’s work often give brief mention to the 
                                                 
5 Pexa mistakenly claims Eastman’s Red Hunters and the Animal People (1904) to be “the earliest 
published collection of tales from Dakota oral tradition,” but Old Indian Legends preceded this publication 
by three years. 
6 Certainly not all of Western philosophy or work in the humanities subscribes to notions of human 
superiority as a grounding epistemology. A wealth of work in posthumanism and animal studies (and 
commonly in ecological and biological science as well) actively rejects this premise and investigates means 
of transforming unbalanced practices that exploit animal bodies and lives.  
7 Perhaps Old Indian Legends has not been much examined because the retelling of traditional tales appears 
to offer fallow ground for critics in terms of questions of identity, or perhaps it appears to be less politically 
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collection, only a small number of scholars have engaged at length with these stories over 
the last quarter century. Instead, much of the scholarly attention devoted to Zitkala-Ša 
concentrates on her semi-autobiographical work of fiction, American Indian Stories, 
more than it does on Old Indian Legends or her other writings.8 Examinations of 
American Indian Stories focus largely on the ways Zitkala-Ša’s work revealed the 
damage done through assimilationist boarding schools, allotment, and settler colonialism 
in general. Her writing is also read for the ways the subject renders her own splintered 
identity through a Dakota perspective unabashedly critical of Euroamerican political 
hegemony (Carpenter 2; Chiarello 14; Cutter 33; Davidson 31; Kunce 75; Lukens 143; 
Newmark 336; Rifkin 29; Schneider 67; Suhr-Sytsma 138; Vigil 172-175). A few 
scholars, however, have taken up Old Indian Legends as a text that offers much critical 
potential. Principally, Myers in Converging Stories (2005) examines at length the ways 
that Zitkala-Ša casts “both racial justice and the environment…as two halves of the same 
issue” (116). He reads ecological responsibility and anti-imperialism as central to the 
stories in her collection. Myers also notes how De Cora’s work adds difficulty to Zitkala-
Ša’s stories since in her drawings “many of the ‘animal’ characters appear in human 
form,” and thus upset a steady assurance in “the separateness of the human from the 
animal world” (124). Elizabeth Ammons also importantly acknowledges Old Indian 
Legends as a text that asserts a new form of realism in American literature. She writes 
that it radically “presents a single cultural reality, which is Sioux,” and inside this reality 
                                                                                                                                                 
salient than her other writings, especially owing to its association with children’s literature which renders it 
seemingly critically inconsequential.  
8 While Kirby Brown notes that scholars in the field of modernism tend to confine their focus to only a few 
Native American literary figures, he observes Zitkala-Ša to be one of a small number of Native writers 
whose work receives critical attention. As such, Brown asserts that her writing constitutes part of “an 
artificially limited ‘canon’ of American Indian moderns … whose lives and work get turned and returned” 
(306). Yet there is much to look at still in Zitkala-Ša’s Legends and in her posthumously published Dreams 
and Thunder (2001). 
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exists “the realism of animals and human beings exchanging forms” (110). And further, 
Jeanne Smith reads Old Indian Legends as a text that survives because its author was able 
to alter its form to accord with “the culture’s contemporary needs” (49). Smith argues 
that Zitkala-Ša “plays the part of the trickster” by fooling her readers into accepting “an 
inherently valuable and living Lakota culture,” and thus confirming Native American 
presence as having primacy in North America (47). While presumably, Old Indian 
Legends predate, for the author and for Sioux people more generally, the incursion of 
Western modes of regarding the world, Smith suggests that Zitkala-Ša artfully crafts 
these legends to reflect contemporary concerns such that she succeeds in critiquing state 
violence through a form of “revisionist storytelling (49).  
As such scholarship demonstrates, Old Indian Legends not only possesses further 
political potential, it has long communicated power through its material presence, as 
evidence of a culture that thrived for millennia through its relationship to the nonhuman 
world. One way the political salience of these tales surfaces is through animal characters 
who function as signifiers of belonging to the “country’s once virgin soil” (89). Animals 
are represented as native figures inherently belonging to the land, and their symbolic 
exchanges with Dakota people emphasize this belonging. Since these stories place 
animals within a kinship network of which the human is also part, a communal culture 
that held kinship relationships to be essential to tribal life emerges as one that sees 
animals as part of this network. Land, animal, and human inhabit the Legends to evoke 
and create a history of relatively harmonious cohabitation that recognizes the sovereignty 
of other animals and the integration of Native people, nonhumans, and the land.  
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Iktomi: The Embodiment of Transformation and Fluidity 
Approaching the transformative promise of such integration, Old Indian Legends 
commences its first scene with an exposition of a character whose disposition is one of 
restless fluctuation. As a liminal figure who gives form and substance to an affective 
overlap between human and animal, Iktomi, the mythical trickster, occupies significant 
textual territory in the collection. Of the fourteen stories that comprise the Legends, six 
feature Iktomi as the title character, while he appears less centrally in four more of the 
tales. That Zitkala-Ša begins with “Iktomi and the Ducks,” and introduces Iktomi as a 
magical nonhuman who occupies a visibly corporeal human form, suggests an entrée into 
a multi-Umweltian realm where an encounter is staged through the very material of the 
body. Iktomi embodies the fairy, the animal, the human, and through this commingled 
incarnation represents a traditional Dakota belief in the potential multiplicities of being. 
Zitkala-Ša’s collection opens with the trickster’s description—one that glides over what 
he is to elaborate more fully on what he does, specifically how he adorns himself. It 
begins:  
Iktomi is a spider fairy. He wears brown deerskin leggings with long soft fringes 
on either side, and tiny beaded moccasins on his feet. His long black hair is parted 
in the middle and wrapped with red, red bands. Each round braid hangs over a 
small brown ear and falls forward over his shoulders. (3)  
This induction into Dakota oral history through the figure of Iktomi confronts the reader 
with a composite figure about whose essence little narrative attention is given; a spider 
fairy, not further elaborated, is presented in a straight-forward manner, suggesting his 
multi-essential nature to be inherently graspable. In addition to the hybridity of his body 
is the exocorporeal addition of clothing made from deer pelts. Iktomi as a composite 
creature assumes additional layers as he dresses in the skins of deer “like a real Dakota 
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brave” (3). In this figure, before his antics even begin, Iktomi represents not only an 
encounter between human, nonhuman, supernatural, and deceased, he signifies a complex 
relationship that is multiple, fluid, and that exceeds the realm of the human, and offers the 
reader a means of imagining beyond that realm as well to discover that alterity is not so 
incomprehensible after all. 
Yet despite his clothing and his human appearance, he is still a being that is both 
fairy and spider—radically other-than-human in a presumably exoskeletal spiderness, and 
also magical as a fairy, which seems to grant him human characteristics rather than 
spidery ones. His spider being, in fact, receives no additional elaboration in the tales, 
such that the opening sentence lingers about like an unanswered riddle. At the top of the 
original manuscript for “Zicha, the Squirrel, and Iktomi,” a story that was only recently 
published sixty years posthumously, Zitkala-Ša herself hand wrote “Iktomi is the spider, 
personified, appearing like an Indian” as though in additional explanation to its reader 
(DAT 65). Still this leaves open the question: Where and how does the spider exist, and if 
it is not in form, since Iktomi presents first as human, then is there a true diminutive core 
to Iktomi that never need assume shape, but is always within? Jeanne Smith explains that 
Iktomi “takes his name from the spider” because he travels through all planes, “through 
air, on water, underground, on land” (46). This, she argues grants him the power to enjoy 
unearthly physical freedom. But Zitkala-Ša translates his being into one that cannot be 
entirely free. That is, “poor Iktomi cannot help being a little imp,” so that his talent for 
moving freely and for assuming guises does not alter his “conceit,” “his vain, vain 
words,” or his “naughty” ways (4). But, in many ways, Iktomi is (arguably) the most 
person-like character in the tales, with his wide assortment of human frailties and 
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susceptibilities. His antics often emphasize the greed and grasping on which colonialism 
thrives, as he inhabits different human and nonhuman forms in an endless effort to 
achieve fulfillment. That he never achieves it, despite his guises, suggests that a 
multiplicity of bodily appearances does not offer one gratification, but that such 
transformations do offer great educational potential, at least to listeners. The stories argue 
for a readerly acceptance of Iktomi’s selfish and deceptive nature, while also 
demonstrating through the trickster figure that multiplicity of being does not involve a 
radical shape shifting to see or appreciate the world differently. Rather, the ability to see 
perspectives comes from a willingness to listen and imagine, this being more important 
than the ability to assume a transformative guise. 
In Old Indian Legends, Iktomi playfully dispels the illusion of boundaries, 
pointing to the multiple and mutable relationships that always exist between humans and 
animals. Iktomi is a manipulative creature common to Dakota legends who is without 
boundaries and thus points to the nature of porous relationships and vulnerability through 
misbehavior. In her own collection of Dakota Texts, Ella Deloria writes that tales 
invoking Iktomi are of a group called the “real ohų’kaką”—tales of incredulity that “are 
best known, oftenest repeated, and farthest removed from the events of everyday life of 
the Dakota people” (IX). Iktomi is understood as a manipulative shape-shifting creature, 
just as he is also sometimes mythological and sometimes a human being. He exists as a 
figure well-known, understood, and continuous across stories while not settled in a single 
form. As Delphi Carstens points out, the trickster occupies “a zone of radical boundary 
dissolution and playful perversion where…human and animal might be brought into 
productive conversation” (95). He acts as an embodied recognition of entangled lives, 
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histories, and kinships, who through his misbehavior, also threatens his own survival 
along with those he ensnares. D. G. Payne points out that the trickster figure as a trope 
works not only to “transgress boundaries” between binary concepts, but by questioning 
and blurring boundaries themselves, the trickster “challenge[s] these binary 
constructions” (186). His very being as a creature who can exercise power and freedom 
through his shape-shifting capabilities possesses the capacity to manipulate human and 
animal trust to satisfy his own impulsive desires.  
Iktomi in his ability to become other than he is (or to never quite be what he is) 
and the presence of animal characters playing out human dilemmas demonstrate trust in a 
readership to accept species substitutions, while also evidencing wariness that such a 
readership will acknowledge culpability for Indian removal unless it is clothed in animal 
skins. While metaphorically critical of Euroamerican intrusion and violence, the Legends 
lack an overtly white presence, such that the tales read as though having been unchanged 
since precontact times. These stories, oriented around morality, relationships, manners, 
and values, thus present a distinctive Sioux identity and culture ostensibly unaltered by 
settler colonialism, even as Iktomi and certain animal characters demonstrate qualities 
that appear consistent with imperialist logics. The stories, though, turn the work of 
dehumanization and animalization around on a Euroamerican populace that had 
historically exploited discourses of animality as part of the logic of disenfranchisement. 
While animals that metaphorically represent colonial powers appear as more blatantly 
animal, they are still not portrayed as devalued beings within the stories’ paradigmatic 
logic; rather, animality works to render the people it represents as unsophisticated, 
unaware, and brutishly enabled by their physicality—reflecting the fierceness of 
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colonialism. And yet within a Sioux belief system that perceives a wholeness among 
beings and the natural world, animals always exist as fellow kin, not as exploitable 
creatures. Even as the stories engage with nonhumans and use them to symbolize human 
people, animals are not rendered abject, but instead create a sense of the continuity 
between creatures and suggest that people are most certainly animal. Iktomi, in his many 
forms and with his spidery essence, which is relatably human in its flawed possessive 
orientation, is still kin and not abjectly other; he assumes the title role in stories which 
demonstrate the variability of being and behavior.  
Animality as Humanizing in “Iktomi and the Muskrat” 
The third story in the collection, “Iktomi and the Muskrat,” highlights the 
obligations of people to share across boundaries the sustenance that comes from the 
natural world, and to resist the impulse to hoard. Within the tale, the two title characters 
contest the importance of sharing sustenance and the obligations of hospitality. As Iktomi 
sits beside a lake amongst wild rice, he ravenously prepares a pot of fish soup, unaware 
of his surroundings and lost in hunger due to his irregular and uncertain meal schedule. 
The spider fairy, “not knowing when the next meal would be…meant to eat enough now 
to last” until the next meal (27). Thinking himself hidden, he is surprised when a 
“dripping muskrat” approaches from the lake with a ready expectation of being asked to 
join, as “was the custom of the plains people” (28). Iktomi, however, does not invite the 
muskrat to eat with him, but remains attentive to the soup. The muskrat is not insensitive 
to this slight and so begins “to feel awkward before such lack of hospitality” and wishes 
to be back in the lake under water (28). In Zitkala-Ša’s telling, the muskrat’s 
108 
awkwardness at being denied a shared seat at the meal and ignored like an unwanted 
guest prompts identification in the reader that extends sympathy to the animal. 
With De Cora’s illustration, which appears opposite Zitkala-Ša’s text in the 
original volume, the muskrat assumes visual form not as a sodden, four-legged creature, 
but as a tall Dakota man, dressed in deer-skin pants and shirt, shifting on his feet in a 
show of unease at Iktomi’s failure of manners (Figure 2). Iktomi appears sitting, ladle in 
hand, looking away from his unexpected visitor, appearing almost humorously pestered.  
  Figure 2: The Muskrat and Iktomi (28) 
The effect of this visual supplement is that it becomes hard to then see the muskrat as 
“animal.” Rather, the text creates a metonymical substitution for the narrative animal 
with a visual human, forcing the reader to see through what could otherwise conceivably 
be read as a children’s tale about a magical speaking muskrat. As elsewhere in the text, 
when DeCora’s illustrations accompany Zitkala-Ša’s stories, the text confronts its 
audience with imagery that shows what the text means by visually revealing animal 
characters to be people. While the narratives already make clear their allegorical 
intentions in that animals with human characteristics enact larger moral lessons—they are 
always already human in their language and behavior—the tales discursively retain a 
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dedication to animal signs and depictions. The drawings, however, disclose the work that 
these animals do.  
While the text’s preface expresses a wish for Indian acceptance by a white 
audience through the appreciation of folklore (so that the “little patriot” may see “the 
great brotherhood of man”), the stories use animals as a bridge toward that acceptance 
(vi). As sentimental figures that marshal a protective impulse, animals function within the 
text to garner acquiescence and sympathy, and to make the Legends instructive principles 
more palatable to a Euroamerican audience. The illustrations, in effect, de-metaphorize 
the tales and depict Indian people as the true subjects of the tales. And at the same time, 
this juxtaposition of text with image that both confirms and refutes the narrative, 
constructs itself a hybrid sense of character in which animal is human and human is 
animal. That the drawing depicts the muskrat as not only human, but as Indian replaces 
the figure of animal innocence with a bemused adult person, perplexed by Iktomi’s lack 
of generosity. This mix between textual identification of the title creature as a muskrat 
with human qualities and manners, and the illustration’s depiction of a Dakota man in 
traditional dress opens up a connection between the two characters whereby they are both 
one, and yet neither belongs to a stable ontologic category, thus calling those categories  
into question. As Jane Bennett proposes, when animal beings are presented 
anthropomorphically through “strategic anthropomorphism,” the lines between species 
distinctions blur such that connectedness among beings can be visualized (99). This is 
particularly relevant when reading Dakota legends where a fluidity of spirit between 
humans, animals, and the nonhuman world is perceived to be foundational to reality. That 
animals are people—and people animals—is rendered both unambiguously and 
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indeterminately through De Cora’s drawings, which portray narrative nonhumans as 
illustrated humans, and thus call into question the Western view of animals as radically 
other. Instead, their alterity is diminished and their connection to human experience in the 
world is emphasized.  
Animal representation in this narrative works to reveal itself as 
anthropomorphization, but in so doing, it complicates its assertions about animal 
potential and openly invites the appraisal of people as animals. This is relevant especially 
in a Native context where, despite settler colonial efforts to degrade Native people 
through comparisons to animals and primitivist associations with nature, Zitkala-Ša and 
Angel De Cora rupture the hierarchical Western view with a vision of untroubled 
interconnectedness. As D.G. Payne notes: “The Native perception of animals as ‘other 
peoples’ rather than a lower order of existence” fundamentally distinguishes traditional 
Native and Western perceptions of animals (188). With the loss of land and Native 
culture resulting from settler colonial incursion, and with assimilationist schooling 
experienced by both Zitkala-Ša and De Cora, this belief system was threatened to be 
subsumed by a more Cartesian view of unassailable disconnection. Yet the conjunction of 
narrative and illustration perform a convergence of human and animal that reasserts a 
view of biospheric continuity that allows animals to stand in for people and for people to 
occupy the place of animal. As Ammons observes, Old Indian Legends “insists on the 
reality of interspecies transformations” and also points to the “indestructibleness” of this 
Dakota view of reality (112). By introducing its readers to a literary vision of Dakota 
people as proxies for animals, and vice versa, the animal becomes more recognizable as a 
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sensible being, and the animality of the human serves to further humanize, rather than 
jeopardize, that position. 
Since the muskrat occupies a place of sympathy for the reader, and not of avarice 
or duplicity, he stands as a nonthreatening and genial presence. Functioning as a symbol 
for the human in this story, in fact, enhances the muskrat’s acceptability, such that the 
dripping, sodden, awkward creature engenders a sort of unwary compassion. The lesson 
in this story becomes easy to swallow because it precludes a sense of defensiveness in the 
reader with its portrayal of an innocuous semiaquatic mammal. With stories that were 
written expressly for an audience unacquainted with Native oral tradition by a writer 
whose life’s work was to gain rights and acceptance for Native people within the settler 
state, the use of animal symbolism allows a critique of colonialism to be more easily 
absorbed. 
Taken with the themes that the tales communicate—that generosity is important, 
that selfishness is destructive, that respect for the natural world is fundamental—Old 
Indian Legends communicates and evokes a Dakota ethos in which relationships between 
humans and nonhumans are not separate and hierarchical but are cooperative and 
dynamic. Greed and a lack of generosity are the behavioral flaws this story warns against 
as Iktomi, in the end, finds himself deprived of his dinner and “almost choked to death” 
by a bone from that same soup (33). After challenging the muskrat to a race around the 
lake, Iktomi offers to carry a stone on his back to slow him down so that “the race will be 
a fair one,” after which the winner will receive the kettle of soup as spoils (30). Iktomi’s 
offer of competition, prize, and the presumption of fairness all go unheeded by the 
muskrat however, who stays behind to take the stew himself. Upon Iktomi’s perspirous 
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return, finding his meal to be absent, he looks into the lake and sees the muskrat there 
with his ankles around the kettle. His hungry pleas for just one bone are answered by 
laughter that comes from above, however. In a disorienting move, Iktomi finds the 
muskrat sitting above in the trees, chastising Iktomi for his selfishness. From his perch, 
the muskrat drops a bone from his tree limb above directly into Iktomi’s throat, laughing 
as the trickster chokes nearly to death until he coughs it out.  
This tale’s conclusion, with its many tricks and illusions—the muskrat’s 
nonparticipation, his reflection in the lake that momentarily obscures his true 
whereabouts above, and the harsh delivery of a moral lesson—all work to defamiliarize a 
Western moral landscape. Just as the story destabilizes the boundaries between human 
and animal, it also calls into question a system of belief that sees ownership as the prize 
that results from competition. It discounts the notion that the winner takes it all, and 
instead claims that engaging in such logic over the practice of equal distribution is a 
lethal strategy. And within this moral paradigm, the story suggests that mockery and near 
deadly gestures of revenge are justifiable. The greater crime, this tale proposes, is that of 
egoism and the desire of full possession. The story of Iktomi and the muskrat emphasizes 
the importance of maintaining equilibrium in terms of access to food and the sustenance 
of nature. One’s human status or ability to out-compete is disparaged in this story that 
champions sharing and integration with the natural world. Instead, a responsibility 
between species to care for one another is part of what it means to behave ethically. 
As Old Indian Legends progresses, the stories move away from tales that focus on 
Iktomi and the punishments he endures consequent to his attempts to fulfill his own self-
interest, and they go on to explore themes of larger cultural threat. The very codes of 
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behavior which the first five stories address through lessons delivered to Iktomi are 
followed by tales that depict monstrous threats to those codes of balance, generosity, and 
a belief in oneness among beings. The final seven stories contend with themes of removal 
from land and family orchestrated by creatures who use their brute strength to appropriate 
Dakota lives and homes. The tales continue to use animal figures as human stand-ins, and 
through this symbolic economy, they critique the brutality of colonialism. Interestingly, 
many of these later stories emphasize the physical, animalistic features of the villains, 
thus animalizing—or dehumanizing—the colonizing figures. Yet as these stories emerge 
from and within a moral and ideological context that views animals as people—as beings 
with vital agency—animalizing descriptions operate within these narratives in a way that 
does not devalue the animal or its life, but instead demonstrates that people are capable of 
unreflecting brutality. The strategic deployment of animality in these stories does not 
diminish the animal or suggest that animals are disposable, killable beings—animals 
remain kin even when they are morally offensive—instead the use of animalistic 
descriptions illustrates the fierceness of colonialism as violently uncivilized. 
The Badger and the Bear 
The first of these stories is one that analogizes the displacements of Native people 
by settler colonialism through animal characters in “The Badger and the Bear.” The story 
describes the appropriation of a badger family’s home, food stock, and arrows by a bear 
whom the badgers rehabilitate from starving rover to robust scoundrel. The badgers in the 
story are endowed with Dakota characteristics and histories, while the bear as a stand-in 
for Euroamerican settlers is depicted in the text as particularly mammalian and predatory. 
His furry coat and sharp canine teeth receive special emphasis as markers of animality 
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that are both strengthened by and threatening to Dakota contact. While a common tale in 
Dakota legend (the story appears in Ella Deloria’s volume as well), this narrative 
circulated in non-metaphorical language in early-twentieth-century Dakota communities 
as well.9 The betrayal, brutality, and injurious ingratitude perpetrated by white settlers 
was well recognized by the Lakota, with this history assuming various rhetorical forms.10 
Interestingly, in Zitkala-Ša’s translation, animals of different species (rather than humans 
of different cultural origins) constitute the cast of the tale, and the features they possess 
work to dehumanize or humanize them in accordance with their suggested virtue. Such 
descriptions play with animality in complicated ways, since the legend simultaneously 
draws strong connections between the interrelationships of humans and animals as people 
endowed by the Great Spirit, and also suggests that some forms of animality align with 
brutality, so that animal signifiers matter. Through her narrative sketch of the bear, for 
instance, Zitkala-Ša’s physical descriptions of its emphatically mammalian quadrupedal 
attributes work to accentuate the lumbering inhumaneness of the occupying group. In this 
story, animals are first humanized, but then, animals are also animalized. 
The story begins with a portrait of the large badger family living at the “edge of a 
forest” where “old father badger” hunts deer and bison and keeps “mother badger very 
busy, and the baby badgers very chubby” (61). This domestic idyll on the forest’s border 
connotes a boundary, as well as a vulnerable location, one not hidden and perhaps too 
easily exposed. With the narrative description of mother badger drying meats on “long 
                                                 
9 This same story (though less detailed) can be found in Eastman and Eastman’s Wigwam Evenings. In 
Deloria’s Dakota Texts, a vaguely similar tale is told as “Blood Clot Boy.” 
10 Lakota Chief Red Cloud, for one, in an abdication speech given on July 4, 1903, recounts a series of 
events following the arrival of white settlers that mirrors Zitkala-Ša’s version published one year prior. In a 
speech transcribed by James Walker, Red Cloud said “the white man came to our hunting grounds, a 
stranger. We gave him meat and presents and told him to go in peace,” just as Zitkala-Ša’s story recounts 
through animal agents (138). Red Cloud went on to say: “The white man came and took our lands from us. 
They put us in bounds and made laws for us. We were not asked what laws would suit us.” (Walker 138). 
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willow racks” and later storing them away in bags “painted all over with many bright 
colors,” a scene of contentment and gendered order begins the tale (62). Myers writes that 
the “clear analogy” to Euroamerican arrival is “impossible to misread” as the badgers 
stand in for Native Americans before the arrival of white settlers (127). Removal from 
their home and subsequent starvation, further analogize white settlers’ arrival as the 
badgers’ home is one day visited by an “unexpected comer,” a black bear who enters the 
dwelling with his eyes focused on the “painted bags on the rocky walls” stuffed with 
dried venison (62-63). Returning day after day for more food, the bear grows “fat upon 
the badgers’ hospitality,” and in a short time, transforms from a “shaggy bear” to one 
with a bright nose and a “glossy” coat (65). Once strong, he becomes covetous and expels 
the badgers from their home, taking everything within, including father badger’s 
arrows.11 The bear brings in his own large family, while the badgers are forced build a 
small hut “a little distance from their stolen house” and begin to starve from lack of food 
(67). Jeanne Smith points out that the bear functions as a proxy for the “early English 
settlers” who bestowed not gratitude on Native Americans for their hospitality, but 
instead “claims of domination” (50). And Myers notes this portion of the story is “an 
obvious reference to removal to reservations” and goes on to argue that the story 
demonstrates Zitkala-Ša’s critique of “Euroamerican separateness” from the land since 
the bear is unable to hunt on his own despite abundant game because he is “equally 
disrespectful toward both land and people” (128). Myers reads the story as an ecocritical 
and sociopolitical critique which posits that the bear’s insensitivity toward people is 
bound up with his lack of respect for the environment. But Myers ties a respect for the 
                                                 
11 Dreams and Thunder includes Zitkala-Ša’s story “Buzzard Skin and the Sea Monsters,” which explains 
the close geographic range that badgers keep towards their dens as a consequence of ranging too far and 
encountering trouble.  
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land with an ability to hunt deer and bison, a skill father badger has when supplied with 
arrows, but lacks once deprived of his quiver (128).  
However, since these natural omnivores both possess the ability to hunt (though 
they eat mainly plants, grubs, and insects), the reader may wonder why either a bear or a 
badger needs arrows at all. That is to say that even though “The Badger and the Bear” 
analogizes Indian removal and white settler colonial intrusion, its title characters are 
nonetheless animal figures. The text not only names them as such, but it repeatedly draws 
attention to the variations in size between the two species, and emphasizes the bear’s 
physical features that mark him clearly as an ursine being. Yet the original text featured 
an accompanying illustration by De Cora that again eschewed literal adherence to the text 
in its depiction of the bear within the badger hut whereby all of the figures are 
represented visually as human beings—in fact, all Dakota people in traditional buckskin 
clothing (Figure 3). The text maintains an adherence to the animalistic features of the 
bear, though the visual accompaniment ruptures that imaginary and in the process creates 
a hybrid creature that is both human and bear. At the same time, the illustration buttresses 
an interpretation that reads the badger family as Dakota people, as the text creates an 
alignment between these peaceable animals and the humans they represent. As the stories 
take place prior to contact, there is no explicit white colonial presence, and thus De 
Cora’s illustration depicts a Native man as the bear, which complicates a reading that 
sees his behavior as exclusively Euroamerican.  
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  Figure 3: The Badger and the Bear (64) 
The text creates a discursive distinction between the two animals in the tale. 
Accordingly granted either more or fewer animalistic features serves to generate a meta-
imaginary of complex symbol crossing. While the story appears on the surface as an 
allegory cautioning against greed and ingratitude, its work as a colonial critique means 
that its application of bodily descriptions which render some characters more animal than 
others clearly delineates who in this story’s scenario is the more human animal. In the 
story’s descriptions, the bear maintains its appropriate urine physiognomy: paws, claws, a 
black nose, and sharp teeth. Yet the bear still speaks (though seldom and rudely), which 
reminds the reader that, despite its physicality, the bear is never really a bear, but an 
allegorical personification—a human stand-in for unconscionable conduct. Meanwhile, 
the badgers are evoked through more humanoid descriptions; the mother badger has 
“fingers” and “hands,” the badger family all “stand alone upon their feet” (rather than 
paws), and the father badger wears clothing “covering his head and entire body in a long 
loose robe” (66-68). There are no references to the badgers’ own furry coats, nor to their 
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paws, claws, noses, or any features that would suggest the figure of an actual badger. 
While the bear has a “big hind foot,” with which he trips the father badger when he 
returns to his rightful home to beg the bear for food, the badger falls “on his hands,” 
suggesting that while the former walks on all fours, the latter must walk on two (71). The 
badgers more “animalistic” features are not only de-emphasized, they are absent entirely. 
Thus, the story presents a tale of animal characters who are always already human 
representations, and yet Zitkala-Ša plays with the degrees to which they embody and 
exemplify their animal representatives. With the illustrations in the original publication, it 
becomes difficult to read the badgers as fully badger, but they retain a sort of innocence 
by their symbolic association with the animal. The bear, however, is cast as more 
materially ferocious and unruly as his animal features become stronger (his coat thickens 
and shines, his black nose glistens, and his size increases), which associates his animality 
with predation. As his verbal descriptors tend more toward the animal, the bear as usurper 
is embodied as both colonizer and unreasonable beast. 
By flipping the script in terms of who occupies the more distinctly animal form, 
Zitkala-Ša creates a symbolic world in which those who perceive rigid and hierarchical 
distinctions between species are cast into the role of animalized villain. The Western 
colonizing usurper is not only interchanged with the body of a bear, but is made to be 
frightened by the very epistemology by which it lives. A Euroamerican worldview that 
holds humans to be separate and distinctively superior to nonhumans takes bodily shape 
within an imposing grizzly form whose physicality and penchant for roaring discursively 
associate cruelty with strength and anger. It is the badger in its hybrid indistinction, 
however, that is capable of pursing justice through humility and a connection to the Great 
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Spirit. Through a lack of separateness, and within a form that assumes integration 
between species, the badger is able to conjure a combatant to the bear’s heavy fixedness. 
After the father badger returns to his old home to beg food, he is sent “sprawling on the 
ground” by the bear, but the youngest and “ugly cub” takes pity on the badger and 
surreptitiously kicks a thick clot of blood his way (68-69). Taking the blood to his sacred 
lodge, the badger sits in “a long silence” and then prays to the Great Spirit to “bless this 
little buffalo blood” (71). From the blood then emerges the “first human creature,” a 
“Dakota brave in handsome buckskins” carrying a magic arrow (72). From the badger’s 
call to the spirit that guides the natural world, emerges a human warrior from “the red 
globules” of bison blood (72). This amalgam of material, spiritual, and interspecies 
connection brings about a resolution to the bears’ hegemonic occupation that undercuts a 
belief in the strength of separation and domination.  
The embodiment of the colonizing usurper in the form of a bear and the story’s 
concentration on the animalistic features of this form suggests that the body’s armament 
remains vulnerable to the larger web of natural and just forces. Upon the avenger’s 
hearing the badger’s story of his ouster, he accompanies his “father” as he goes once 
more to beg food (72). As the bear watches their arrival, he sees the arrow and guesses 
that “the avenger of whom he had heard long, long ago” has arrived (73). While the bear 
offers food for the first time to the badger as a “generous deed,” the avenger demands 
with a “voice deep and powerful” that the dwelling be returned, looking on as “his black 
eyes burned a steady fire” (74). It is not violence or magic that compels the bear, but the 
firm voice of conviction alone. The avenger, transformed from animal blood, is able to 
challenge the corporeal strength of the bear, who faces a threat that appears beyond 
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bodily but involves a final reckoning. In face of the “steady fire” of justice, the bear’s 
“long strong teeth…rattled against each other” while his “shaggy body shook with fear” 
and he cries “as if he had been shot” (74). Even this strong body is vulnerable to the 
larger force of justice and coexistence among beings. The bear’s powerful physical 
features become nearly irrelevant when challenged with a reckoning with the voice that 
speaks for the continuity between life forms. It is the bodies who refuse to recognize that 
relationship that threaten themselves and the futures of other beings.  
Significantly, the Blood Clot Boy, as he is known in Dakota oral tradition, calls 
the badger his father, and from his conjuring through the badger’s plea and the buffalo’s 
blood, this human emerges armed with a magic arrow which has the power to vanquish 
the bear. Yet the avenger never uses the arrow, but instead through voice and a look 
which communicates a clear unwavering judgment, he compels the bear to abdicate the 
badgers’ dwelling. This human avenger thus holds seemingly divine powers, and the 
story concludes with an intervention that deifies the Dakota brave while it also portrays 
him as offspring to an animal “father.” This equation between the divine and an origin 
story that begins in the blood of an animal and a summoning by an animal father presents 
a world in which animals hold creational power—where human origins trace directly to 
animal life. Hogan notes that “according to many of the old stories, animals are our 
elders, our ancestors, our sisters…they were here before humans were even imagined or 
dreamed of…humans came later, imperfect and not quite whole” (8). “The Badger and 
the Bear” illustrates this chronology and this ancestral debt as one that binds human and 
nonhuman, and grants no preeminence to human offspring. Relatedness is instead the 
thread that runs through. As Ammons writes, Zitkala-Ša’s stories convey “one complex 
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universe that embraces—weblike—all worlds, visible and invisible” (111). In this world 
of interconnectedness, the principle of human and nonhuman continuity powerfully 
materializes in the story to vanquish the creature who even though well-armed is still 
vulnerable to a more powerful, web-like world in which human and nonhuman 
cooperation and co-creation work to maintain justice in the face of brute aggression. 
Animal Symbols as Misplaced Foes 
The avenger appears again in later stories as a hero figure who, armed once more 
with a magic arrow, saves an Indian community from a “terrible red bird” with “man-
hungry” intentions (78). In “The Tree-Bound” and “The Shooting of the Red Eagle,” 
animality figures once more in a mode that personifies the predations of colonialism. In 
these two stories, the US nation state assumes form as an eagle, not only the country’s 
symbol, but a symbol of Western government power since the Roman era. The red eagle 
in Zitkala-Ša’s telling is a voiceless man-eater who looms above and threatens to strike 
indiscriminately. This symbol of American governmental force is large enough and 
hungry enough to “threaten the safety of the people” who seek temporary safety in their 
wigwams (78). It also embodies a form of alterity in that it is rapacious and monstrously 
large. Here, animality is used to attribute predatory qualities to a symbol of the United 
States. This animal is so monolithic that it need not even possess a voice but can glide 
with “lazy indifference” above a terrified community, assured of its ability to 
unannouncedly take as it chooses (97). As a symbol of the US, the eagle communicates 
power through a quasi-naturalization; as Nicole Shukin argues in her analysis of the 
beaver as Canada’s national symbol, “animal signs” appear to announce their command 
“from the universal and disinterested place of nature” (5). Here, the red eagle is 
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“impartially” capable of consuming Native lives. The eagle keeps watch on the village 
from a hillside perch, and soars each day overhead “as if he could pounce down...and 
devour the whole tribe” (96). While the avenger at last appears (preceded by Iktomi who 
impersonates his prowess but is quickly uncovered), he succeeds in killing the eagle with 
a poisoned arrow. De Cora’s illustration features the avenger fringed with long feathers 
himself, adorned in the bodily material of the animal he pursues (Figure 4).  
  Figure 4: The Shooting of Red Eagle (98) 
By omitting direct representation of the eagle, but mirroring its presence in the avenger’s 
clothing, it suggests that he is already clad in the predator’s plumage. Myers argues that 
this scene “imagines resistance against Euroamerican power” as one that “springs up out 
of the very grass” (130). Thus, through an animal symbolic, the killing of the eagle 
represents resistance against an imperial, biopolitical power. Yet troublingly, evidence of 
the eagle’s body in the illustration uses animal life as a more palatable foe (and target) 
than state power itself would be. That is, while animals function in stories to make certain 
lessons easier for white audiences to absorb, they also sometimes betray the ideological 
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wholeness of ecological being they espouse when they use violence against animals as an 
acceptable substitution for a confrontation with imperialism. Here, the eagle’s demise 
reads and visually appears as salutary, rendering its life as extinguishable by its 
anthropomorphic association with human political barbarism. 
Amphibious Affects 
This is to say that not all the stories in the collection can be read as affirmations of 
the unassailable kinship between humans and nonhumans. Its textual construction as 
dependent on symbology makes unavoidable the ambivalent perspectives Old Indian 
Legends includes on the relationship between Dakota people and nonhuman others. In the 
final section of stories, “The Toad and the Boy” casts the amphibian as an envious 
character who desires human love and regard, and attempts to capture it through the theft 
of a young boy. While the toad is described as “ugly” and its behavior as criminal, the 
story nonetheless grants interiority, rationality, and a complex sense of yearning to the 
animal. Though the story draws a line between human and toad, it also suggests that 
familial type relationships are possible between the two. “The Toad and the Boy” begins 
with a scene that describes the many uses animal bodies are put to in Dakota life: wild 
duck roast while women make down pillows, and a mother in a buckskin dress fringes a 
deerskin cushion with porcupine quills. This introduction to the text points to the sacrifice 
of animals which constitute the fabric of comfort and sustenance for the Dakota people, 
and sets the stage for an intervention that complicates an easy acceptance of this sacrifice. 
There is a vexed quality to this story that acknowledges kinship while also lending a 
sorrowful malevolence to the toad that steals the mother’s baby while she is out cutting 
firewood.  
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The toad may be read as a radical encounter with animal alterity that 
simultaneously rejects the toad and renders it sympathetically alienated. The short story 
shifts from the wailing mother’s voice calling for her child to ten years later, when “a 
little wild boy” playing in the reeds overhears this same wail which brings tears to his 
eyes (123). He runs back to his “hut of reeds and grasses” and calls to his “mother,” the 
“great old toad” (123-24) (Figure 5).12 The boy, the story goes, was taken from his 
wigwam by the toad who longed for more than her own brood of small toads as “none of 
them had aroused her love, nor ever grieved her” and so she longs to keep her stolen 
human son with her, and tries to imitate the human voice that enthralled the boy (124). 
Representing a connection between toad and human that is warped, hollow, and yet 
insists on the animal’s desire to wrest human love, the story suggests an affinity (at least 
from the toad’s perspective) for a relationship across species boundaries as a means to 
fulfillment, even if it must be acquired maliciously. The boy, non-cognizant of his non-
toadness, accepts his toad mother but wonders aloud why his siblings are different than 
he is. His sense of alterity and of kinship despite difference points not only to the boy’s 
sense of acceptance, but to the plausibility (though clearly fictional) of a familial 
connection between two fantastically different beings. In his work that calls for a 
recognition of human animality and an avowal of the animal, Christopher Peterson writes 
that kinship associations are always already problematic since “kinship is based on a 
logic of sameness” that works to either include or exclude (12). Similarly, Zitkala-Ša 
challenges a “recognition of sameness” between humans and nonhumans that Brian 
                                                 
12 De Cora’s illustration for this story omits an interpretation of the toad and depicts only the boy as he 
walks through the tall grass. This omission of the toad, as other animal characters are rendered in human 
form suggests that this animal is less symbol than an exploration of the complex relationship between 
Dakota people and animals. 
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Hudson argues is fundamental to many Native ideologies (8). While this story suggests 
that relationality crosses species’ lines is possible, it also firmly insists on the necessity of 
exclusion and boundaries. 
   Figure 5: The Toad and the Boy (124) 
While Zitkala-Ša’s American Indian Stories concludes with a contemplation of 
the inalterable alienation she endures following her boarding school assimilation 
experiences, this story draws attention not only to the displacement of the boy but 
suggests that alienation and despair may affect the animal other as well. Though the toad 
is repeatedly described as ugly and mendacious, she displays a complex depth of 
interiority. Even as the story suggests the animal is repugnant, she also deploys agency 
and demands the sort of “equal consideration” that Hudson says “Indigenous ways of 
thinking” about animals requires (3). When the toad ventures to sing as the boy’s mother 
does, she does so in “a gruff, course voice” and her lyrics include articles like, “doe-
skin,” “Ermine,” and a “red blanket”; she mistakenly believes that the Dakota sing of 
valuable pieces rather than loved ones (125). From the animal’s point of view, she 
surmises that the remnants of other creatures might be what people value most. In this 
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way, the toad reads human consumption of animal bodies as primarily important, 
asserting a profound value to articles derived from living material. The boy, unmoved by 
the toad’s song, ventures out to find his mother’s voice once again, and as he goes, the 
toad acknowledges “within her breast” that she both cannot keep the boy longer, and yet 
cannot relinquish “the pretty creature” either whom she taught to address her as mother 
(125-26). Though the boy reunites with his human family, the narrative focus on the 
toad’s interior quandary works to attribute complex and contradictory desires to the 
“ugly” animal, placing it in the text’s central ethical position. The human is not the 
central figure nor the conflicted conscience, rather “the big, ugly toad,” in its reach for 
more hails the reader with a call to recognize its nonhuman alterity as insistently relatable 
(124). 
Encountering Old Indian Legends as a collection of stories that confronts settler 
colonialism with a worldview that asserts connections across ontological boundaries—
that sees continuity between humans and nonhuman beings, and imagines the possibility 
of transformation as inherent rather than radical—a contemporary reading becomes 
possible that views representations of animality as augmentative to the notion of 
personhood. Rather than threatening or demeaning (as Euroamerican uses of animality 
would be to the idea of human autonomy), animal figures and comparisons add depth and 
a sense of ecological connection between characters in these texts. The human emerges as 
not a static, separate, and superior entity, but as a relational person among animal people 
whose boundaries intersect, adapt, and take on different (and seemingly inconsistent) 
shapes. Not only does a call for the recognition of Dakota people and culture surface in 
these stories, but so does a world that places the human squarely among other beings, 
127 
sharing the same spaces and similar experiences, longings, and impulses. Animals 
materialize as beings with agency and perspectives that lend depth to our own, while 
grasping humans are figured as animals who exploit their own bodily conditions too 
readily. 
As the muskrat functions as a creature that stands against competition and 
inhospitality, the badger and bear turn Western logics of animality on their heads by 
emphasizing how mammalian characteristics are part of the cadre of domination and 
theft, while cooperation and acceptance across difference are more valiant traits. That 
humans and animals coalesce into hybrid subjects within the imaginary of the text that 
features illustrations of Dakota people in stories where they are identified as animals 
suggests that human beings are enhanced through these refigurations. Yet the stories 
which feature animals as envious creatures suggest a necessary wariness of a full 
commitment to equal kinship between all species. Still, humans do not emerge as 
radically different, separate, or hierarchically greater, just as animals do not appear 
deficient, inferior, or wantonly killable. Instead, these stories present a complex web of 
relationships in which beings live together and beside one another, with frequent forays 
into each other’s spheres. Relationships and physical domains intersect in these stories as 
they necessarily do on a shared planet. In such a context, distinctions between species, 
and the disproportionate sequestering of resources appears as not only unethical but 
unthinkable. Zitkala-Ša’s work as the first printed English-translated collection of Dakota 
oral literature stands as a foil to narratives of Euroamerican conquest through possession 
and domination, and insists instead on the obligation that people have to take care of one 
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